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LET US FOLLOW THE GLEAM

We who have found Christ Jesus precious want others to share the discoveries that we have made as we have committed ourselves in obedience to Him. Most of us were brought up in Christian homes, and have had access to the Bible from childhood. We have heard it read, and have read it ourselves. Yet we did not know the things of which we now speak, even though we may have heard others tell of them. For they must be discovered, and their discovery is an individual experience.

Ever since these discoveries have become part of our daily life, we have wanted to share them with others, and we have done so as opportunity arose. Just now our thought is of the men and women of Islamic inheritance, who form such a large part of mankind. We wish that they might share the things that we have discovered in Christ.

We know, and acknowledge gladly, that the Muslims have a knowledge of God, and that they have a zeal for Him. They possess also some knowledge of Christ, as once we did. More than one passage in the Qur'ān speaks of Jesus. Yet what the fullest of these passages tells us is only a beginning. They speak of His authority over disease, and even over death, but that He brought forgiveness of their sins to those who had faith in Him is not said. It is said that He was taken up into heaven, but not that He is today a present Friend, and an energizing Power in men's lives. It is said, indeed, that God loves His obedient servants, but not that, when a sinner repents, the love of God is spread abroad in his heart, in the new experience of God which Christ has brought. These are some of the things we have come to know by personal discovery, and we wish that Muslims

might share their life-changing reality. We say, "We have discovered." The fact is, of course, that God has made us know these things.

There was a time when Muslims and Christians were not so aloof from each other. Muhammad was once on most friendly terms with Christians. In days of persecution he sent his own daughter and her husband, along with others, to a Christian country for protection. In the great conflict between Christianity and paganism which shook the world of his day, he stood for the Christian cause. The Qur'ān speaks in commendation of devout Christians. The basal practical religious conceptions of the Qur'ān are Hebrew-Christian conceptions. Somehow there came a rift. However, Muhammad persisted in certain of the early ways. He remained poor, when he might have become rich. He was ever thoughtful of the poor. He continued to be a man of religious devotion, resembling in this the Christian devotees. His adherents in turn had instructions not to molest such devout people, and in a somewhat later day many of his followers saw in Jesus the ideal of the ascetic life which they pursued. Too often these things have not been understood, or they have been ignored. Our desire is that the aloofness may cease, and that Muslims may come to know the things about Christ that have become a reality to us. Our problem is how this may be brought about, so that their joy and our own may be fulfilled.

We have need, it would seem, of these things: of a genuine concern for the Muslims; of a truer understanding of Islam; of a clear idea of what is to be accomplished; and of some idea as to how this may be brought about.

We Christians need a spiritual concern for the men and women of Islam. That such a concern is lacking among American Christians today needs no argument. Rather, there is even wide ignorance of Islam, and there is indifference to the welfare of its adherents. Among Christians who live in Muslim lands, in daily contact with Muslims, there is even more urgent need for a concern as regards their Muslim neighbors, so that the welfare of these neighbors

will be continually on their hearts and in their thought. It is out of such a concern that action springs.

Given this concern, we need a truer understanding of Islam—not only of the external facts about the rise and spread of Islam, its Prophet, its Book, its Traditions, its formal belief and practice; but also of that inner quality that has made Islam a religious influence in the lives of untold millions. We need to understand the religious values of the Qur'ān, and the spiritual interests, aspirations and needs of devout Muslims. We need a sympathetic insight that will enable us to approach Muslims on the level of their personal religious life, the level of what is vital and most precious in their experience, the level also of burdened hearts. It is on this level that Christ offers His grace, and works His transformations.

There is need for a clear conception of what is to be accomplished. It is not a matter of great movements. It is not in the sphere of intellectual controversy, or of group loyalty. It is deeper than conventional religious belief and practice. It is something related to the inner life of the individual. It is not something done, and then all is over, but the beginning of a process. It is the initiation of an eternal spiritual development. It is the coming into being of receptive and obedient, Christ-oriented personalities. To this end what can we do?

For God to accomplish His purpose in the life of any man, the man must be His surrendered servant, receptive to His truth and obedient to His will. These attitudes are inculcated in the Qur'ān in many places. They are the fundamental attitudes of the religious life. Attention can be called to them, and to the necessity of their conscious adoption and their becoming paramount and permanent. It is thus that hearts are made ready to receive God's visitation, His promise of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit.

Again, help can be given Muslims in their becoming acquainted with the teachings and ministry of Jesus. Very few of them have ever had opportunity to know about these things. However, in the early centuries of Islam,

Muslim scholars read the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, as quotations in their writings show. One of the great caliphs of Islam ordered the Bible translated into Arabic, so that Muslim scholars might know what it contained. Especially, Muslims know very little of the teachings of Jesus, and these can be put within their reach. People of every religion appreciate these teachings, when they come to know them.

Further, we can tell of our own experience, what Christ has done for us. Intimacy may open the way to sharing the experiences of our daily lives, letting another see how life's problems may be met. A three-fold plan that can be put into immediate operation includes 1) constant prayerfulness, 2) loving helpfulness, 3) personal witness. The order is important, even essential. Prayerfulness must come first. If one has a concern for the Muslims, he will be continuously in a spirit of prayer on their behalf. Prayer is needed that we may be kept in tune with the will of God, that we may be made aware of spiritual situations, that we may know where and when and how to act and to speak. Love expressing itself in helpfulness is integral to the life in Christ. In the presence of human need it moves to action. Thus through man the Divine love is active, finding outlet and expression. In the experience of such assistance men may come to realize that God, as we know Him, is a Friend, that He is not One of Whom men should live in continual fear. As to our witness, the working of Christ should be apparent in our lives, so that to live is to witness of Him. Also, the time will come for us to speak of the inner secret of our lives. For the witness of the life is not complete without the testimony of the spoken word.

JOHN ERNEST MERRILL

Beacon, New York

WOMEN OF THE DESERT

A little girl brought me in contact with the thousands of people from the desert. Newly stationed near the edge of the Sahara, I had only heard of these nomads who came down to the valleys of French West Africa and even into Nigeria in great camel caravans, seeking pasture for their flocks.

I had seen the symbol of the cross on the high pommels of their lavishly ornate saddles, and on the hilts of all swords carried by any of these veiled men of the desert. I knew that the white veils covered the faces of the mysterious, fair-skinned Twaregs, and that the Buzus, the Negro serfs who wore indigo-dyed veils and robes, spoke their language.

I had seen the beaten-silver ornaments of the desert women, called *Agadez* crosses. I had wondered at the origin of these fair people. Still more I had wondered about the origin of the emblem of the cross which was upon all their possessions, for I knew that they were Muhammadans.

These caravans, with women and children crowded on the high and haughty camels, had a fascination for me. I knew that the Sudan Interior Mission had made repeated applications to the French government to open work in Tahoua, one of the nearest of the large oases. The reply had always been, "The natives of this area are too dangerous." Little did I dream, as I watched them go by, with grave aloofness, seemingly inapproachable, that many of these people would soon be my friends.

Then she was there, my first Buzu patient. They called me out of the dispensary to the veranda where she had been placed, away from the clinic crowds. When I gingerly lifted the corner of the cloth which covered even her face, all thought of the romance of camel caravans, veiled nomads, history of symbols, was driven from my mind.

Frightened black eyes gazed at me in mute appeal, and the shrunken skin lay in tortured folds over a face wasted with suffering. From head to foot this child was covered with the infectious sores.

More painful than this repulsive external manifestation of her serious condition was the complicating arthritis which drew up her limbs and made her a helpless huddle of misery. She could not feed herself; she could not sit up. When at last I was through, my patient was whimpering with pain and relief and I was exhausted. She looked like a veritable mummy, swathed from head to foot in bandages.

Specific treatment brought almost incredibly fast recovery. In one month Yar Dangi wore no bandages and she was able to stand on her feet and take a few cautious steps. She could feed herself.

Then Yar Dangi went home. Her parents must have returned by the same route on which, some weeks ago, they had been forced so often to stop to give Yar Dangi relief from the pain of the camel's motion. They must have stopped again at each place to advertise what the white man's medicine can do. The North just seemed to move in on us, hundreds of Twaregs and Buzus came, some from oases as far as two hundred fifty miles away.

Thus it came about that, though I have not gone far into the desert to meet these women in their homes, they have come to me, to make their home in my dispensary compound. I was in Hausa territory, and the Hausas hate these people who, a few generations ago, raided their villages for slaves and carried them into the oblivion of the North. My desert patients found no welcome in *their* homes, so they accepted gratefully the inadequate accommodations that we had to offer. They are not as bold, or forward, as are the Hausa people, and this reticence was brought to our attention soon after their hordes had started to come.

A fellow missionary and I found a family, a very poor family, frugally feeding twigs into a tiny fire over which they huddled as the cold Harmattan wind tore with its chill, piercing fingers at their sparse clothing. There was no blanket. The woman was helping her husband apply a poultice, which we learned was warm cow dung. This, they said, would relieve the aching in his legs.

Each patient gets a treatment card at the morning clinic, so I asked to see his card. He stepped back and modestly said he was suffering from a cold.

That can mean anything in Hausa, so I asked him if he were coughing.

"That's it," he said, "I cough."

Had he been afraid of me? Or had he felt that my patience would wear thin if he would add all his ailments to those of his family and I would treat none of them? I do not know, but I do know that a Hausa man would have marched on ahead and demanded his own medicine first. Let his wife take care of the family!

There is more understanding family spirit in the Buzu family than in the average Hausa family. The Buzu woman is cherished in a way not seen in Hausa families where the wife is often considered and treated merely as chattel.

Needless to say, this man had proper treatment the next day and we did our best that night to find shelter for the family from the wind and cold, for desert nights in the *harmattan* season are raw and chill. Our huts were already crowded, and there were even patients under unfinished thatched roofs which were being made to increase our accommodations. Propped up a few inches with a load of wood, the patients squirmed underneath as best they could. We found a small, unoccupied roof, meant to cover a bath house, which, with crowding, would hold our family from the North.

Thoughtfulness was further demonstrated when Tanisulum, a Buzu woman, came to have treatment for an ulcer which had made her a helpless cripple. Her husband was kind to her and through the weeks was patient, caring for her needs.

She came back later, truly sorrowing because her husband had died. The ulcer had broken out afresh, though she was able to walk. One day I chided her for not coming to our afternoon service. She said nothing. It was another woman who explained the custom that widows must wear old dark, clothes and after sunset must not go out of doors

for a hundred and twenty days after the death of their husbands.

I learned that these desert people are monogamous and, when a Twareg marries a Buzu, it is the tribe of the woman that determines the rank of the children. That is to say, the children are considered Twaregs if they had a Twareg mother. Children, no matter how fair their skins, offspring of a Twareg man and Buzu woman are called Buzus. Naturally, with such an honored position in the family, the women are more open minded and intelligent.

Another reason for a broader outlook is that these desert women are not locked behind high mud walls as are their Hausa sisters of the better class home. Only the poor Hausa women and widows are allowed the freedom of these nomadic women who live, for the most part, in small, flat, rectangular shelters built of grass matting. Fortunate it is for them, then, that a nomad cannot build walls about his home, for those inside such forbidding walls are often locked out from all hope of hearing of Christ.

Nor are their hearts enclosed within the same barrier of suspicion and opposition as those of the women of the Sudan. Their minds are open to the message of the Gospel, and I have found to my joy that they are far more receptive than other women in Africa. It has been a delight to lead many of them to the Lord.

I remember Tamu, who was a Twareg, accompanied by a little, old, withered Buzu woman who was her companion and servant and a continual source of hilarity for all of us. When I first saw Tamu I coveted her for Christ. When we brought her the great message of saving grace she grasped it eagerly, intelligently. It was marvelous how she grew in spiritual understanding as the days went by.

Then it was time for her to go home and I saw two fine young Twaregs coming toward us.

"They are my sons!" she exclaimed. Then thinking first, in her joy of their coming, of sharing her salvation, she added, "I want you to tell them about Jesus, too."

This warm concern for those in her family circle may

not be greater in these women, but it certainly is openly manifested where in others it is restrained.

One day the crowd of some two hundred patients had gathered for the short Gospel service which precedes the daily clinic. I was take aback when a young Twareg girl, who had come only a day or two ago, came to my side and, slipping her hand into mine, she said, "I like you. We shall be friends."

How urgent, too, is the need that they should grasp quickly the Word of Life. In all that great area above us, sweeping in an enormous semicircle, I know of not one missionary for a radius of far over a hundred miles.

In Ajiyar Kwariya, where a great crowd gathered, we asked whether there was anyone who had ever heard the Gospel before. One man spoke up. He had heard once, twelve years ago!

When I returned from that trek I realized that God had granted me a unique means of reaching thousands of souls from hundreds of different communities. They came and listened day after day, as they received help for their physical ills, at the morning pre-clinic service and, if they were on our compound, there were various other ways of dealing with them.

Christian Hausa phonograph records attracted them to our "family" services in the afternoon. An old saint of God, who had spent many years in Africa, told me before I went to the field: "No argument—no amount of eloquence—can take the place of the Word of God. Remember that."

I remembered and found that it works.

Then someone sent me some "Wordless Books," which, with their pages of black, red, white, and gold, typify the lost state of man without God, the blood of Christ which alone can remedy the sinful state, the forgiveness which blots out the stains and makes us white as snow, and the blessed hope of a home in heaven. These booklets I would recommend to anyone who is teaching the Gospel to illiterates. I gave them to those only who learned every verse.

The Wordless Books not only contained by suggestion

a clear outline of the Gospel, but each page was a reminder of the Scripture passages which might so easily slip out of the memory if there were no one to prompt and nothing to give hint as to their context. Furthermore, the booklet was a treasure that they could show their neighbors and family.

All of this work, naturally, was done in the Hausa language, which is known to most of the desert people who migrate south each year. For some of them it was very difficult.

Mazhgo was an old Twareg woman who could live very little longer. Even palliative remedies did little to relieve the painful symptoms of a disease which was robbing her of her vitality.

One day when I was unusually busy I was told that Mazhgo was outside of my house waiting for me. I sent word that as soon as I was free I would come out to see her. I was so preoccupied with the many duties awaiting me at the dispensary that I forgot all about her.

She was not affronted, but she followed me to the dispensary.

So I forgot my pressing duties and sat down with her and told her the wondrous story of Christ, crucified for our sakes, buried in a grave which could not hold Him, Who has power over life and death, of His coming again for His own. She was ready, seeking for the Savior, so she found Him, receiving Him right then and there as we sat together on the cement floor of the empty dispensary building.

I asked her to thank her Lord for this salvation. She said, "You must tell me how."

"You must speak what is in your heart—and He hears in any language."

So Mazhgo poured out her heart in her mother dialect and I joined her in my heart; then, after she had finished, I prayed aloud in the Hausa language for God to keep her and make her His witness. As the medley of languages rose like incense I knew they had been translated into the language of heaven.

MARTHA WALL

Hillsboro, Kansas

THE HISTORY OF ISLAM IN INDIA III

From the Mutiny of 1857 to the Establishment of Pakistan, August 15, 1947

While our main purpose has been to trace the political developments affecting the Muslims of India, or in which they have had a part, we may profitably, before proceeding to consider the political events of the period, spend a little time in examining the general position of Islam in India before the partition of the sub-continent.

A. *General Notes on Islam in Pre-partition India*

Islam has been in India for over twelve centuries. For much of that period we have little or no information as to how Islam was spreading among the people, how it was affecting the culture into which it had come, or how it was being affected by that culture. There are only scattered hints here and there until we come to the modern period, but for this period the material is so plentiful that we shall hardly be able to skim the surface of it in the time and space at our disposal.

Indian Muslims, according to the 1941 census, numbered about 92,000,000.[63] This number, though distinctly a minority as compared with the 255 million Hindus, exceeds the population figures for any pre-war European nation except Russia. There are almost twice as many Muslims in the Indian sub-continent as there are people in the British Isles. There were more Muslims in pre-partition India than there are white people in the British Empire.[64]

The 92 million Muslims were by no means evenly distributed over India. There were two main blocks of territory which were predominantly Muslim. One of these was in the north-west, including parts of the Panjab, all of the North-West Frontier Providence, Kashmir, Sindh, and

[63] *Census of India Report, 1941,* quoted in *The Hindustan Year Book for 1944,* p. 341.

[64] Sirdar Ikbal 'Ali Shah, "The Political Aims of Muslim India," in *The Asiatic Review,* April, 1942, p. 152.

Baluchistan. The second main block of Muslims was to be found in Bengal and Assam. Bengal was 54% Muslim in 1931, and about the same in 1941. Assam was 31% Muslim in 1931, with an especially strong Muslim majority in the Sylhet district on the border of Bengal. The predominance of Muslims in the north-west may be attributed to the fact that the Muslim invaders of India always came through that area, and there was great pressure upon the local inhabitants to embrace Islam. In the eastern and northern districts of Bengal were large numbers of people nominally Hindu but who had probably never been fully accepted as such. It would appear that they responded readily to the Islamic teaching of the equality of men, and particularly during the 14th and 15th cenuries, large numbers of them became Muslim.[65] In the north-western area, the Muslims were proportionately on the increase. In the Panjab, for instance, while the Muslims were 47% of the population in 1881, they were 49% by 1901, 52.4% by 1931, and 53% in 1941.[66]

Although Islam was introduced into India from other countries, and by foreigners, only a very small percentage of Indian Muslims are of foreign extraction. Both the 1911 and the 1921 Census reports give the percentage of Muslims of foreign origin in the Panjab as fifteen. This refers to those who trace their descent through the male line to one of the foreign "castes" or families. It does not take into account the possibility of inter-marriage with women of local families, which has been a common practice.[67] By far the greater part of the Muslims of India are of the same racial origin as their Hindu neighbors.

Sufism has had a big part to play in the spread of Islam in India, and members of the main Sufi orders performed the role of missionaries in various sections. But Sufism in India has often degenerated into saint worship and *piri muridi*. The *pir* is the religious teacher and guide, and the

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[65] Wm. Crooke, *Herklots' Islam in India*, p. 1.

[66] *Census of India Report for 1911*, Provincial Report for the Panjab, Part 1, p. 161. *Census of India Report for 1931*, Provincial Report for the Panjab, p. 320. *Hindustan Year Book for 1944*, p. 343.

[67] *Census of India Report for 1911*, Provincial Report for the Panjab, Part 1, p. 173. *Census of India Report for 1921*, vol. 1, part 1, p. 116.

murid is his disciple. Some of the *pirs* number their *murids* in the thousands. When the *pir* dies, his grave is venerated by his followers, who usually transfer their allegiance to his son, who becomes *pir* in his stead. Bishop J. A. Subhan in his book, *"Sufism: Its Saints and Shrines in India,"* lists almost 550 Sufis whose shrines are centers of worship in various parts of India. More than a third of these are in the Panjab, in the western section of which practically every person has his *pir*.[68]

B. *Political Developments*

1. Muslims and the Mutiny of 1857. The Mutiny of 1857 definitely marked the end of an era so far as the Muslims of India were concerned. Their position in the subcontinent had changed, it is true, even before this, from the days of the Great Mughals, but there was always the possibility that the original position of ascendancy might be regained, so long as there was still even a nominal Mughal ruler. But with that ruler in exile, and the British Crown in direct control, that hope was now gone.

There were various causes which had a cumulative effect resulting in the Mutiny. The British had annexed several states which it had at first been understood would continue, Oudh, for example. This policy made the rulers of other states uncertain of their position. There was social unrest as a result of the unemployment which followed the disbanding of private armies, and the expropriation of certain lands by the British. Western culture was gaining headway, and many feared that indigenous culture and religion would be eclipsed. The reaction of the Indian troops to the introduction of rifles using cartridges greased with animal fat (the Hindus suspected it was cow fat, and the Muslims suspected it was pork fat) was thus simply the match which set fire to the tinder, dry and ready to burn.

In the struggle which followed, there were Muslims on both sides. Among those who assisted the mutineers may be

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[68] *Census of India Report for 1911*, Provincial Report for the Panjab, Part 1, p. 172.

mentioned the Begam of Oudh and many of the landlords of that province who had recently been dispossessed. Also, there was Bahādur Shāh II, the nominal Mughal emperor, who was proclaimed emperor of Hindustan when the mutineers took Delhi. Among those who gave great assistance to the British may be named Sir Salar Jang, the minister of Hyderabad, and the Begam of Bhopal.[69]

As a result of the Mutiny, the Indian Empire was brought directly under the sovereignty of Great Britain, and there was no longer even a nominal Mughal emperor, though Muslims still ruled in a number of the native states.

2. Muslim Reaction to the New Situation. From the time of the annexation of India, the position of the Muslims entirely changed. From having been the rulers a century and a half earlier, they were now reduced to the status of a minority group under a foreign government. Even before the British established full control, they had established institutions of learning which taught western culture, and which centered around the teaching of the English language. Many Hindus entered these schools, and quickly learned the rudiments of English as well as something of western culture and civilization. The Muslims, however, with few exceptions, held aloof. They wanted to have nothing to do with the new rulers, or with what they taught. As it was required that government servants should know English, Hindus were included in the services in ever increasing numbers, whereas only a comparatively few Muslims could qualify.

The first outstanding leader to sense the nature of the crisis facing Islam in India was Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, later knighted by the British government. Born in Delhi in 1817, he was at the time of the Mutiny a subordinate judge in Bijnaur. He saved the lives of many Europeans by sending them at once to Meerut. In 1869, he went to England, taking his two sons with him so that they might have the advantages of an English education. On his return to India,

[69] Majumdar, Raychaudhri, and Datta, *An Advanced History of India*, pp. 772-9.

he founded a college at Ghazipur, and in 1875, he founded the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, which later became by charter the Aligarh Muslim University. The work of Sir Sayyid Aḥmad and later leaders of the Aligarh movement has been of inestimable value for the Muslims of India.

About ten years after the founding of the Aligarh University, the All-India National Congress came into being. As the leader of the Muslim community, Sir Sayyid Aḥmad refused to admit the claims of the Congress that it was representative of the Indian nation. Sir Sayyid Aḥmad was a firm believer in the "two-nation" theory which was later accepted by the Muslim League. He considered that the Muslim leaders who entered into the Congress movement were traitors to their own community. In fact, he did not think that Muslims should enter into current politics at all. His view was that the future of India lay within the sphere of the British Empire, and that the future of his community lay in whole-hearted co-operation with the British.

3. Muslims and the Nationalist Movement. The two decades from 1885 to 1905 saw the rise of the nationalist movement in India. It was largely Hindu in character, with but few Muslims joining in. Many Muslims, either following the lead of Sir Sayyid Aḥmad, or because of political indifference, did not associate themselves with the movement.

Early in the first decade of this century Lord Curzon suggested the partition of Bengal as an aid to the administration of that difficult area. The proposal was that the eastern part of Bengal which was predominantly Muslim, should be united with Assam. The new province would have had a population of eighteen million Muslims and twelve million Hindus, and the Muslims would have been in an advantageous position.[70] As it was, the Muslim population in Bengal was effectively over-shadowed by the more powerful and better educated Hindu group. The partition was carried out in 1905, and immediately there was a strong

[70] W. R. Smith, *Nationalism and Reform in India*, pp. 70-1.

and lasting Hindu reaction. As a counter-reaction to the opposition of the Hindus, there was founded at Dacca, Bengal, on December 30th, 1906, the All-India Muslim League, under the leadership of the Āghā Khān. It was just about this time that the Morley-Minto Reforms (finally put into operation in 1907-8) were under consideration, and the Āghā Khān led a Muslim delegation which called on Lord Minto in 1906 and presented a claim for separate Muslim representation in different governing bodies. This principle was accepted, and the Morley-Minto Reforms included provisions for separate electorates for the various communities, with "weightage" for the Muslims by their being represented by a larger number than would have been their due by actual count. Thus, the Muslim leaders of the day won an important victory for their community, even though the partition of Bengal, which they had favoured, was annulled in 1911. It is not unfair to say that the establishment of Pakistan was, ultimately, the fruit of the seed of communal representation planted in the soil of Indian politics forty years ago.

Having been founded as an avowedly communal organization, the Muslim League continued its communal activity under the leadership of the Āghā Khān until about 1913. By that time, some of the Muslim leaders were beginning to catch the spirit of nationalism which was growing up through the activities of the Indian National Congress. Within the League itself, the nationalist Muslims won out, and the Āghā Khān resigned his leadership.

In 1916, Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnah was president of the Muslim League. In that year, the Congress and the League came to terms on the matter of a proposed nationalist government, and agreed on certain points on the basis of which they would continue the struggle for self-government. The so-called "Lucknow Pact" included the principle of communal representation with weightage in each province in favour of the minority community.

In 1920, the Congress and the League, both meeting at Nagpur, passed another set of joint resolutions, in which

they agreed to co-operate in certain aspects of the non-co-operative movement.

But Hindu-Muslim relationships suffered a severe set-back in the decade from 1920 to 1930. In an up-rising of the Mapillas, a Muslim group in the Malabar area, it is estimated that approximately 10,000 Hindus lost their lives, either at the hands of the Muslims or because of the famine which resulted from the fact that many fields in the area were not cultivated. This occurred in the winter of 1921-2. In 1924, there were communal riots in Delhi, and later in many other places. This period saw the rise of the Hindu Mahasabha, the Hindu counter-part of the Muslim League, militantly communalistic in its viewpoint. In spite of a fast by Gandhi in the interests of communal peace, and a series of "Unity Conferences," the communal difficulties increased, and 1926 and 1927 were bad years.[71]

Although Jinnah had not had a share in the non-co-operative movement in 1920, he was, even in the last part of that decade, interested in communal harmony, and was one of the leaders of that section of the League which favored co-operation with the Congress. But the group which was most in favor of the nationalist movement finally broke away from the League completely, and organized the All-India Nationalist Muslim Party. The leaders were Dr. Abul Kalām Āzād, Dr. Ansāri, and Dr. Muḥammad 'Alam. In the year 1930, Jinnah left for Europe.

In an attempt to come to an agreement with Indian leaders on the terms of government in India, the Round-Table Conferences were held in London from 1930 to 1932. Jinnah attended as one of the Muslim representatives from British India. Against a background of inter-communal riots in Kashmir, Jammu, and the United Provinces, the Round-Table Conferences worked in an atmosphere of extreme tension, and the Hindu and Muslim representatives failed to come to an agreement.

4. The Success of the League in the Struggle for

[71] Ibid., pp. 355-6.

Supremacy in the Muslim Community. Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnah returned to India in 1934, apparently convinced that he could no longer work together with the Congress in the struggle for Indian freedom. He was made permanent president of the Muslim League, and began his campaign to organize the Muslims into a communal unit.

The Constitution of 1935 was duly formulated by the British Parliament and plans were made to put it into effect. Its communal representation features are of most concern to us, as they show what concessions the Muslims had been able to win at the Round-Table Conferences. There were to be two Chambers of the Central Legislature: The Council of State and The Federal Assembly. One hundred fifty members of the Council of State were to be elected in British India, 140 of them in the Provinces. Of these 140, the Muslims, according to the final arrangement, were to have 49. In the Federal Assembly, the Muslims were to have eighty-two out of the 250 British India seats. The Hindus were to have at least 105, but the distribution of other seats was such that the Hindus could have won at the most 48% of the total number, and their representation would probably have been about 42%. As the Hindus constitute two-thirds of the total population, this was "minority protection" carried to the extreme.[72]

Elections under the new constitution were to be held in 1937. All parties began marshalling their forces. The communal parties such as the Mahasabha and the Muslim League put up their candidates for election within their own constituencies. The Congress, as a non-communal party, had its candidates in various constituencies. The League, while winning 108 out of 482 seats reserved for Muslims in the provincial legislative assemblies, polled only a small percentage of the Muslim vote. After some dispute over the right of the Governors of provinces to take over the administration of the provinces under certain conditions, the Congress finally authorized the forming of ministries, and, ac-

[72] Ibid., p. 436.

cordingly, in seven provinces, Congress ministries were set up: Bombay, Madras, the United Provinces, Bihar, the Central Provinces, Orissa, and the North-West Frontier Province. In Sindh, the Panjab, and Bengal, non-Congress coalition ministries were formed, all with Muslim prime ministers. The three were Khān Bahādur Allāh Bakhsh in Sindh, Sir Sikandar Ḥayāt Khān in the Panjab, and Mr. Fazl-ul-Haqq in Bengal. Allāh Bakhsh was avowedly Nationalist Muslim. Sir Sikandar Hayāt and Fazl-ul-Haqq were nominally members of the League, but disagreed with many League policies.

Jinnah now intensified his communal activities. Members of the League who were also members of the Congress were dropped from the rolls. Before this, it had been possible for a person to be a member of both. Jinnah himself had been a member of both groups until about 1930, when he left the Congress.

The League made good use of the situation resulting from the out-break of World War II to strengthen its own position. When war was declared, the British Government proclaimed India a belligerent. The Congress immediately objected to this action, but the Muslim League authorized Mr. Jinnah to assure the British that it would co-operate in the war effort, if assurance were given that Muslim interests would be protected against the power of the Hindu majority in India. In reply to these reactions, the Viceroy issued a "White Paper" on October 17, 1939, which fell far below meeting the claims made by the Congress, and which recognized, implicitly, the right of the League to speak for the Muslims of India. Congress issued instructions to its ministries in the provinces to resign, which they did. Jinnah's reply to this was to call for the celebrating of a "Day of Deliverance," now that the Muslims had been released from the rule of the Congress ministries.

In his presidential address at the session of the All-India Muslim League in Allahabad in 1930, Dr. Sir Muḥammad Iqbāl, a leading Muslim poet and philosopher, had said, "I would like to see the Panjab, the North-West Frontier

Province, Sindh, and Baluchistan combined into a single state, self-governing within the British Empire. The formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India."[73] Though Iqbāl later saw the divisive effects of his suggestion and made amends by writing a hymn called "Hindustan Hamare," which presupposes Indian unity, his statement was taken up by a group of Muslims at Cambridge University, and "Pakistan" was the name given to the proposed new Muslim state. In the year 1940, at the time of its meeting in Lahore in March, the Muslim League passed a resolution which included the following passage: "That no Constitution would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Moslems unless it is designed on the following basic principle, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Moslems are numerically in a majority, as in the northwestern and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."[74] Thus the Muslim League put its seal of approval on the plan for Pakistan, a separate Muslim state. Many Muslims, even Muslim Leaguers, were opposed to the scheme, and the three Muslim prime ministers all voiced their protests. In April, 1940, a meeting of the All-India Independent Muslim Conference adopted a resolution stating the opinion that India is an indivisible unit, and that from the national point of view, the Muslims of India are Indians. In addition to the Independent Muslim Conference, there were other groups which were nationalist in their aims, rather than communal. Among these were the Jami'at ul 'Ulama, the Momins, and many of the Shi'a community.

In August, 1940, the Viceroy made certain proposals regarding the expanding of his Executive Council to in-

[73] *Islamic Culture,* vol. XIII, p. 499, under "Cultural Activities."
[74] *International Conciliation,* June, 1942, p. 353.

clude more Indian members. As President of the Congress, Abul Kalām Āzād refused the invitation of the Viceroy to discuss these proposals. Jinnah met the Viceroy, but found the proposals inadequate. Other Muslim Groups were not consulted.

The next important event was the visit to India of Sir Stafford Cripps with the British Draft Proposals for a new solution. These provided that any province which did not accept the new constitution could remain outside of the new India and make a separate agreement with the British government.[75] In the correspondence and discussion which followed, it became clear that the British were not prepared to put the responsibility for the defense of India into the hands of Indians. It became clear, too, that the British were recognizing the right of the Muslim League to speak for all Indian Muslims, since other Muslim organizations which endeavored to get a hearing with Sir Stafford were denied the privilege. Both the Congress and the League rejected the Cripps Proposals as unsatisfactory.

Thus by the spring of 1942, it began to appear that the League had gained a strategic point—it had gained recognition as the only mouth-piece of the Muslims of India. If a Muslim wishes to gain recognition as a nationalist, he could join the Congress. If he wished to be heard as a Muslim, he must join the League. As has already been mentioned, the three chief opponents of Jinnah's policy were the three Muslim provincial prime ministers. Of these, Fazl-ul-Haqq resigned from the League Working Committee and Council in September, 1941, and in December of that year he was expelled from League membership. He was able, however, to remain in his position as prime minister. Early in January, 1943, Sir Sikandar Ḥayāt Khān died of a heart attack. In May, 1943, Allāh Bakhsh, who had previously been dismissed from his office as prime minister of Sindh, was assassinated.

By the year 1944, the League had been able to set up a

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[75] *Peace Aims Pamphlet*, No. 14, *India, 1939-42*, p. 15.

ministry in the North-West Frontier Province, but only because the Congress Muslims of the Province had been imprisoned with other Congress leaders following the civil disobedience campaign in 1942. When they were released, the League ministry immediately fell. In the Panjab, the Unionist Party, a coalition group, had put Sir Khizr Ḥayāt Khān, a relative of Sir Sikandar, into the prime ministership. By this time, the League was claiming that it had control of the Panjab, but later, the twenty-five League members of the Panjab Assembly definitely joined the Opposition. In Sindh, the third Muslim majority province in the north, the situation was obscure. It could never be quite certain at that time just where Ghulām Hidayat Ullah, the prime minister, stood, whether with the League, or not. Later, he came out and out for the League, but at this time, he was still wavering. Nor could the League claim Bengal.

The elections held in the spring of 1946, however, completely changed the picture. Contested by the League directly on the issue of Pakistan or no Pakistan, it resulted in an overwhelming victory for the League. The League won all of the thirty Muslim seats in the Central Assembly, and 428 out of the 492 Muslim seats in the Provincial Assemblies. The League was defeated only in the North-West Frontier Province, where Leaguers were returned in seventeen out of thirty-six seats. In the Panjab, however, there were enough minority seats together with Unionist Muslims to outvote the League party, though it was the largest single party in the Assembly. In the crucial vote over the Speakership, the Coalition candidate, a Unionist Christian, Diwān Bahādur S.P. Singha, was elected by a vote of ninety-one to seventy-nine. In the Sindh Assembly, there were two groups of almost equal strength. The Leaguers, with twenty-seven members, were the largest single party, and were asked to form a ministry. When the three European members decided to vote with the Government, this gave them thirty votes, or exactly half of the Assembly. An almost ludicrous situation arose at one time when both groups were insisting that the other group's candidate should be the

Speaker, for the party which had the Speakership thereby lost one vote on the floor of the Assembly, and the balance was so even as to depend on this single vote. In Bengal, there was a Muslim League ministry.[76]

On March 23rd, 1946, before all results of the Provincial elections were known, the Cabinet Mission arrived to study the situation and try to work out a scheme by which the various parties could come to an agreement and set up a responsible government composed of Indians. Their discussions with different leaders and groups began on April 3rd. Early in May, representatives of the leading communities were called to Simla for consultation. When they failed to come to an agreement, the Cabinet Mission on May 16th published their own suggestions. The proposal was for an Indian Union, with a central government having charge of defense, communications, and foreign affairs. A constituent assembly was to be set up to work out provincial and central constitutions. This was to work in three groups: "A" group, composed of Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces, Bihar, the Central Provinces, and Orissa, "B" group, composed of the Panjab, the North-West Frontier Province, and Sindh; and "C" group, composed of Bengal and Assam. These three groups were to work out provincial constitutions for the provinces in the groups, and to decide whether certain powers not reserved for the Center should be delegated to a "group government." British India seats in the Constituent Assembly were to be 292, of which seventy-eight were to be Muslims, with one more from Baluchistan. There were to be ninety-three seats in all from the States, making a grand total of 385. An interim government was to be set up, made up of representatives of those parties which accepted the proposals.

The League decided to accept the plans for an Interim Government, although Jinnah made certain counter proposals with reference to the Constituent Assembly. The Congress accepted the long term proposals but not the pro-

[76] Muhammad Ashraf, *The Cabinet Mission and After.*

posals for an Interim Government as the names announced by the Viceroy included the same number of caste Hindus as Leaguers, and no Nationalist Muslim. The Viceroy then set up a "care-taker" government made up of government officials, a large number of whom were British. The League on July 2nd withdrew its acceptance of the proposals for an Interim Government. After the League withdrawal, the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, on August 14, asked Pandit Nehru, then President of the Congress, to form an Interim Government. Nehru invited Jinnah to assist him, but Jinnah refused. It was made clear that five seats would be available to the League when it chose to nominate its ministers, and later that year, in October, the League decided to join the Interim Government.

In joining the Interim Government, however, the League made it quite clear that it was not accepting the plans for the Constituent Assembly as proposed by the Cabinet Mission.

In the third week of February, 1947, came the announcement that the British Government had decided to leave India by June, 1948. That year saw much communal rioting in different places. There had been large scale rioting in Calcutta in the previous August, resulting in so many deaths that it was called "The Great Killing." Now there came riots in the village areas of the north Panjab. Still later there were riots in Noākhalī district in Bengal, and again in Bihar.

On March 3rd, the Panjab Coalition Ministry resigned. The Governor asked the Provincial Muslim League leader to form a ministry, but he was not successful, and the Governor took over the administration of the Province under Section 93 of the India Act of 1935.

Late that month, Mountbatten replaced Wavell as Viceroy, and early in April he began discussions with the Indian leaders, continuing for about two weeks. By May, 1947, partition seemed to be generally accepted as inevitable, with Congress and Sikh leaders insisting on the sub-partition of the provinces of Bengal and the Panjab into Muslim majority and non-Muslim majority provinces.

Early in June, after much discussion with the leaders of various parties, Lord Mountbatten announced his plan: that on August 15th there should be set up two Dominions of the British Commonwealth, Pakistan and the Indian Union. Pakistan was to be composed of two areas. In the north-west, there was to be part of the Panjab, Baluchistan, Sindh, and a plebiscite was to be held in the North-West Frontier Province to determine its position. In the eastern area, Bengal was to be divided, and a plebiscite was to be held in the Sylhet district of Assam. A Boundary Commission was to be set up to determine the dividing lines in the Panjab and Bengal. Reluctantly, all the main groups accepted the decision. The Congress and the Sikhs were reluctant as they had never favored partition. The League was reluctant, because Pakistan would lose large areas of the Panjab and Bengal. In the plebiscites which followed, Sylhet voted overwhelmingly for Pakistan, as did also the North-West Frontier Province. In that province, the Congress party in which there were many Muslims, did not contest the plebiscite, although it had won the election in 1946.

On August 14, in a ceremony at Karachi, Lord Mountbatten formally handed over power to Pakistan, with Muḥammad ʿAlī Jinnah as its first Governor-General. That night, at midnight, in a similar ceremony at Delhi, the Union of India came into being as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. But the joyousness of the occasion was marred by the inter-communal rioting which had broken out several days earlier in the Panjab. It raged for weeks on both sides of the border, and members of the minority communities were forced to flee for their lives. Before the frenzy had spent itself, hundreds of thousands of people had been killed, and millions uprooted from their homes. The present estimates of numbers of Muslim refugees chiefly from the East Panjab and Delhi total about six million, with about five million non-Muslim refugees from Pakistan. While figures can as yet be only approximate, the new nation of Pakistan is said to have a population of about seventy million, of whom about fourteen million are Hindu.

By far the greater part of the Hindus are in East Pakistan. There are some thirty-five million Muslims in the Indian Union.

There is now, therefore, once again a Muslim ruled state in north India, covering a considerable area, and this state now has a majority of Muslim subjects. Many problems remain to be solved. Relationships with the Union of India have not yet settled down. The problems of Kashmir has yet to be solved. But in the past, as we have seen, Muslim empire in India was weak because, in the effort to obtain more territory, the emperors did not give themselves to the task of building a consolidated empire. It is to be hoped that the questions with reference to territory may be speedily solved, so that Pakistan may be able to give its time and effort to the most important task ahead of it, the building of a strongly based modern state, worthy of the best traditions of Islam in India.

JAMES D. BROWN

Gujranwala, W. Panjab, Pakistan

THE RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MUḤAMMAD II

(Concluded from our April issue)

It is generally known from all the descriptions of Muhammadanism, how Muḥammad was affected when inspiration came upon him: he grew red in the face; sweat poured from his forehead; he fell groaning to the ground, and sometimes lost consciousness. In this condition he often heard a voice speaking as when one talks to another. As I have mentioned, his time was not unacquainted with these phenomena. When he appeared with his message he was very quickly faced with the assertion that he was possessed with a demon *(majnūn)* and thus was placed in the same class as the soothsayers and poets. This tormented Muḥammad because he believed that he had his message from God himself through his angel. Seen from outside, there would not be for us any difference between the inspiration of Muḥammad and that of the poets of his time; because in this the similarity is too great. The difference lies only in their manner of conceiving the origin of the inspiration. In this connection I will touch on a problem which is not without importance. If spoken revelations have a poetical form and are of considerable length, we must always suppose them to have been prepared by the person receiving them when he was again in his normal condition. For instance, none of us would maintain that the prophet Isaiah, in visions or in auditions, experienced all the words with which we now credit him. He prepared that which he experienced in his prophetical ecstasy, and proved himself to be in possession of eminent poetical gifts, which in our opinion does not detract from but rather enhances the value of his words. Nor is it otherwise in the case of Muḥammad. There is no reason why it should be evidence against the genuineness of his experience.

The peculiar form which Muḥammad's prophetic paroxysms took cause psychiatrists to say that he had a weak constitution and that he apparently suffered from epilepsy, or whatever they now can hit upon. Even his Byzantine bi-

ographer, Theophanes, regarded him as epileptic. Perhaps this is right, but on the other hand, I cannot refrain from giving a warning against the strong tendency of many doctors to write the case-history of persons of the past, believing that in doing so, they have revealed everything. They only give us some important information but seldom the most important.

The chief question for us is whether or not Muḥammad believed in his message himself. All his life he maintained that he had got his message from God, and I do not think that there can be any doubt that in the beginning of his activities at any rate he believed fully and firmly in his mission. I shall state different points which speak in favor of his honesty. After the first revelations a pause followed which tormented him in the highest degree. He roamed about the cliffs anxiously and restlessly and even thought of committing suicide until he was comforted and encouraged by new revelations. He had a very considerable feeling of the difference between his own words and those which were put in his mouth. It says in 75:16: "Let not your tongue run with the revelations so that you make too great haste; it is for us to collect them and recite them, and when we recite them, then follow our recital; afterwards it is for us to explain them." In 69:44 God says: "If Muḥammad had fabricated any of the sayings concerning us, we would have taken him by the right hand and cut his artery." The strong moral consciousness which is so plainly shown in the oldest Suras of the Meccan period also speak decisively against the idea of Muḥammad as a deceiver. I have already mentioned Sura 74; and one could also cite the beautiful Sura 93:3ff: "Thy Lord hath not forsaken thee and beareth thee no grudge. Thy end shall be better than thy beginning and thy Lord will grant thee that wherewith thou shalt be satisfied. Did he not find thee an orphan and take thee to himself? Did he not find thee straying and guide thee? Did he not find thee needy and make thee rich?"

Muḥammad's moral consciousness also appears in his bad conscience, when he once turned angrily away from a

blind beggar while he was converting a rich citizen of Mecca. Then he heard: "He frowned and turned away because the blind man came to him. How knowest thou if he was not sincere and would be admonished and if the admonition would not have benefited him? But the rich man hath thou treated kindly without hesitation, if he was sincere" (Sura 80:1-7). A conscious deceiver does not speak and act in this way.

As I have mentioned before, the science of religion is interested in the manner of Muḥammad's religious awakening and also in what caused it, and I mentioned that it is possible that the sermon which he heard from the monk in the market place at 'Ukāẓ may have made a violent impression on him and worked on his mind until it suddenly forced itself out with irresistible power and appeared as a revelation of Allah.

However, the ascetic stamp which marks Muḥammad's first appearance points to his having a closer connection with Christianity than this one sermon. Many of the oldest Suras attach great importance to vigils with prayers and recitals of holy writings. For instance 73:2, addressed to Muḥammad, says: "Arise and watch for most of the night, the half of the night, a little more or a little less, and recite the Qur'ān," and 25:65 says: "The servants of the Merciful are . . . they who pass the night casting themselves down and raising themselves up for their Lord." These pious exercises are not taken over from the Jews, as no command of this kind is found in the Jewish laws, whereas they play a very important rôle with Syrian monks and anchorites, so that there can be no doubt that it is by them Muḥammad was influenced here. This also explains his benevolent attitude toward the Christian monks, for 5:85 says: "You will meet no greater enemy of the believers than the Jews and the heathens and none more inclined to friendliness to the believers than those who say: "We are Christians," for there are priests and monks amongst them and they are not arrogant." Everybody will agree in saying that these words point to a more personal connection with the monks than a second- or third-hand re-

port. One can go still further and prove, as Tor Andræ has done, that the theme of the sermon which is so often used in the Qur'ān about death, judgment and eternal retribution shows a considerable similarity to the style of Aphrem the Syrian (d. 373), a similarity which even appears in words and phrases. In the sermons of Aphrem we also find a parallel to the famous descriptions of paradise, where believers are recompensed for their want and sufferings in this world. Even beautiful women are hinted at in Aphrem. Of course these thoughts are not a direct loan from Aphrem the Syrian, if only for the reason that Muḥammad could not read (in any case not the Syriac), but is influenced by the Syrian Christians whose great ideal was Aphrem the Syrian.

It could also be proved that Muḥammad's conception of Jesus points to personal intercourse with Christians, but that is beyond the scope of this article.

Muḥammad's personal contact with Christians just mentioned seems, according to certain hints in the Qur'ān, to have been continued in Mecca, even after he had begun to appear as a prophet. For it says in 16:105: "We know indeed that they say: Surely a man teacheth him! He at whom they take aim, speaketh gibberish, but this [that is to say the language of the Qur'ān] is a clear Arabic language." This a typical piece which is expressed in such obscure phrases that we cannot see what lies behind it. Baiḍāwī's commentary here states that a Christian slave Jabr, by name, is referred to. He is also mentioned in other sources. The historian Wāqidī says that this slave was converted to Islam when he heard Muḥammad recite Sura 12 about Joseph. The case is really the opposite; it is Muḥammad who is dependent, if there is any truth at all in the information. Muḥammad's opponents at any rate, were quite sure that he obtained his material from another source. This they made use of in heckling him, maintaining that he had not got his revelations from God at all, but that they were something he had heard from others. It says in Sura 25:5f, aiming at them: "The unbelievers say: It is nothing but lies, which he has made up, and in which strangers help him. . . . They say: Fables

from ancient times, which he copies, and which are dictated to him morning and evening." If Muḥammad's honesty on this point is to be proved, which is not easy, these tales which he heard from others, rang again in his ears when he had his paroxysms, so that he believed that it was something which Allah inspired in him. It is not, perhaps quite beyond question, that Muḥammad gradually became unable to distinguish between his ordinary thoughts and that which was revealed during his paroxysms. I shall return to this question in connection with his activities in al-Madīnah.

From our knowledge of Islam in its later form we might have expected that monotheism was the central point in Muḥammad's preaching from the very beginning. However, it was not. As I have already mentioned, it was the preaching of the judgment which took the central place, but Muḥammad was very soon to find that he spoke to deaf ears in his native town. During this fruitless struggle monotheism begins to be of increasing urgency to him. It is curious to see how the thought of one God and His universal power is in close connection with Muḥammad's moral consciousness of his own mission. The difference between the one God and many gods is strikingly expressed in 39:46: "When the one God is named, the hearts of those who believe not in the life to come shrink with horror, but when the others are named they are glad." I am not aware that in any other place in the history of religion outside Judaism and Christendom we have the thought so clearly expressed, that mankind's feeling of moral responsibility is strengthened by the one God. For Muḥammad in any case it was a sustaining thought that this one God who had revealed himself to him alone would call people to account on the day of judgment, and therefore it was Muḥammad's duty to warn the people of Mecca, regardless of success. In his despondent periods it was certainly discouraging for him to get so little attention from the people of Mecca. But his faith in God was not diminished by this, and he came quite naturally to the conclusion that if the people of Mecca did not believe in his preaching it was Allah himself who had ordered it so. It is for him a natural

consequence. The idea of predestination which gradually arose in him can be understood in connection with his own unsuccessful attempt to convert the inhabitants of Mecca. But it cannot be denied that, as by degrees the less attractive points of his character appear more clearly, one of the motives of his forceful description of the punishments of hell is due as much to his own wounded vanity as it is to his reverent belief in the almighty power of God. God becomes more and more the arbitrary and cruel despot. Muḥammad goes so far as to give predestination a form which is extremely offensive for us; he reports Allah saying: "The word from me shall come true: I will fill Hell with demons and men together" (32:13).

In order to throw light on Muḥammad's character it will be of significance to consider other incidents which took place during his stay in Mecca. It is not as generally known as it should be that when the relations between Muḥammad and the inhabitants of Mecca were almost at the breaking point, and he was thinking of getting some of his adherents to safety, he sent them over to Abyssinia. Those who ascribe absolutely the lowest motives to all his actions, see in this, of course, a political move, directed at the people of Mecca, who had been at war with the Abyssinians in the years previous to Muḥammad's birth. It is not entirely unreasonable to suspect Muḥammad of this motive, especially if one considers his masterly qualities as regards political intrigues in the Madīnah period. I will not deny, therefore that this thought also played a part, but I do not think that it was the chief motive for him. When he applied to the Christian emperor in Abyssinia, it was simply because at that moment he did not see any great difference between his own teaching and Christianity. I imagine that the friendly reception the Negus gave his people is one of the reasons why Muḥammad felt much more kindly toward the Christians than the Jews, whom he hated and persecuted.

While these first exiles were in Abyssinia, something happened which was very nearly fatal to the future development of Muhammadanism. Under the constant chicanery, to

which Muḥammad was subjected from the Meccans, it was a very valuable help to him that his own family, according to an old Arabian custom, stood by him through thick and thin. To counteract this the Meccans made a solemn pact to exclude all Muḥammad's family from commerce and marriage with the other inhabitants of the town. As at the same time, they annoyed Muḥammad's followers by all possible means, it is comprehensible that under this pressure he tried to meet the wishes of the Meccans by suspending hostilities against their gods and even announced a revelation declaring that one could put one's trust in their favorite goddesses' prayers of intercession to Allah. This was, of course, grist to the mills of the Meccans, and the result was as expected. The tension between the two contending parties lessened and reconciliation took place, rumors of which spread right over to Muḥammad's followers in Abyssinia. For them it was a welcome opportunity to return to Mecca. But shortly before they reached Mecca they were informed that now things were really bad between Muḥammad and the Meccans. For in meantime Muḥammad had recalled his declarations about the goddesses. The whole story gives an extremely interesting insight into Muḥammad's soul, so I shall describe how it happened. It is said that when Muḥammad came home after the reconciliation with the Meccans (if rumours of this had reached Abyssinia it must have been some time later), the angel Gabriel revealed himself to him and put it to him that he had inserted a sentence in his announcement which had not been revealed to him. Muḥammad had to acknowledge with sorrow that what he had said previously about the goddesses was inspired by Satan. Instead the part of the Qur'ān in question was turned into an attack which showed that these goddesses were only imaginary. We can see what consequences this must have had for Muḥammad in his relations with the Meccans. If things were bad before, they now became quite unendurable. The Meccans did not fail to mock Muḥammad because he did not keep his word. The story is instructive in more than one respect. It shows that Muḥammad did not shrink from publicly acknowledging

his mistake even though in doing so he appeared as a strange, vacillating person both to his adherents and his opponents. But the story shows us Muḥammad using for the first time an expedient which was to be an extremely dangerous measure in his hands in al-Madīnah. While on this occasion in Mecca he did not make use of the abrogation of an earlier revelation for personal advantage, this is the means he later used on a large scale to obtain something for himself.

The relations between Muḥammad and the Meccans reached such a pass that a break had to come sooner or later. This happened in the year 622 when he slipped out of the town and started for al-Madīnah, after a number of his adherents had set off in advance. It was a break, a declaration of war, not just a flight, as the Arabic word *hijra* is usually wrongly translated. From now on he was at war with his native town. Even if the easy-going and non-war-like Meccan grandees who composed the Town Council, did not, in the beginning, think of carrying on active warfare against him, he was certainly, from the very start, animated by the thought of obtaining redress for his personal insults from his fellow-citizens and regaining the right to take part in the cult in Mecca. Thereby was given that chain of religious and political aims which from now on characterizes Muḥammad's endeavors and which apparently changes his personality to such an extent that it is difficult to understand that the zealous prophet of judgment of the first years in Mecca could develop so disadvantageously. Sometimes one sees his life almost paradoxically described, as if it fell into two sharply defined parts: in Mecca only good can be said of him, whilst in al-Madīnah he was almost a scoundrel. But of course the real facts are not so. It is one and the same person we have to deal with; if he was a scoundrel in al-Madīnah there must also have been defects in his character in Mecca. On the other hand, if there were good points in him in Mecca, they could not have been entirely suppressed in al-Madīnah. The reason that we get such an essentially different impression of him, must first be sought in the insufficient sources of information we have by which to judge him in

Mecca. Secondly, it is not improbable that the changed external conditions played a large part in developing weaknesses of character in him.

As long as Khadījah lived he did not marry other women. She died in Mecca, and in al-Madīnah, as is well-known, he married a number of other women. Khadījah's strong influence over him appears in a statement of his later favourite wife, 'Ā'ishah, who maintained that the only person she was jealous of was Khadījah. The changed milieu in al-Madīnah forced Muḥammad to play a political rôle and to set consideration for his adherents, the new community, higher than consideration for the inherited laws which demanded unity in the family and the clan. When he placed himself above the old laws, we understand that it was of the greatest consequence for him to obtain confirmation of the justice of his actions through revelations.

I have several times mentioned that we have seen attempts at actions that were not dictated by the purest motives alone. The story of the goddesses of Mecca was very informative in that respect. But in al-Madīnah that kind of thing became much more gross and repulsive. His behavior is characterized by attacks on colonies of Jews, attacks on the caravans of the natives of Mecca, in spite of all time-honored customs and habits, many marriages, and a notable power to secure advantages by political methods. All this is certainly so well-known that I need only mention it. But there are also other points where a perceptible change for the worse can be traced. The Suras of al-Madīnah are on the whole greatly inferior to those of Mecca. Remarkably little is felt of the strong religious ecstasy of the first period when he began to receive revelations.

The relapse is also noticeable in another sphere. Already at the end of his time in Mecca there was a tendency to make use of tiresome repetitions, but in al-Madīnah it is as if the source of revelations ran more and more sparingly. One seeks in vain for new religious thoughts from him at this period, except for one original thought which certainly seems to be dictated by other considerations than the moral-

religious. This is his assertion that Abraham was the founder of the true religion and cult of the Ka'ba in Mecca. This idea was addressed controversially against the Jews after he had broken with them. They had not been able to refrain from mocking him, and criticizing his version of the Old Testament accounts. His answer to this was that it was they who had distorted the writings and had deviated from the teaching of Abraham. Moreover by this he intended to make it clear to his adherents that *they* had a right to get possession of Mecca, because it was a holy place, whose cult needed renewing after the natives of Mecca had soiled it with their idolatry. Political motives also plainly play a part in his ideas of Abraham as the true Muslim and the Ka'ba as his shrine, to which one should turn during prayer.

The better side of his religious life in al-Madīnah only comes out on occasions when we can see his gratitude to Allah for His help in situations which were of the greatest danger for him, but which ended in an over-whelming victory. This is supremely true after the battle of Badr (624), where Muḥammad's followers won an absolutely decisive battle over a far more numerous Meccan army. This was, both for himself and his followers, a confirmation that he was Allah's chosen messenger, and that Allah would lead his cause to final victory. Or one could refer to the beginning of Sura 48 (after the Hudaibīya agreement) where the victory which Allah had given him was taken as proof that Allah would forgive him his sins. But even the beautiful phrases in which he expressed his gratitude and his consciousness of sin on this and other occasions are not capable of removing the bad impression one gets of the way in which he again and again made use of his revelations to obtain what he wanted, and to establish the justice of his actions when he had offended his associates by his behavior. I will quote a single incident to give a clear impression of his methods. Once, on one of the prophet's many expeditions, his favorite wife, 'Ā'ishah, Abū Bakr's daughter, lost a necklace and left the camp to look for it, without anyone noticing. While she was gone the camp broke up. When she came back to the

camping-ground and discovered that the others had left, she sat calmly down, wrapped in her cloak, to wait until a messenger was sent to fetch her when it was discovered that she was missing. In the meantime a straggler came by, took her up on his camel and rode off to catch up with the others, but did not reach them until the morning of the next day. Then of course, the gossips got busy, and sides were taken for and against her innocence. Her enemies cast so many aspersions on her that the prophet cast her out. She returned to her parents. However, it was not long before Muḥammad felt the loss of her to be unendurable. To this was added the not unimportant point, that the disowning of her would have dangerous consequences for his friendship with her father, Abū Bakr. During a visit to her parents Muḥammad suddenly had one of his prophetical ecstasies, and afterwards announced the glad tidings that Allah had revealed to him that 'Ā'ishah was innocent. But he also got a revelation which was well-suited to put a stop to gossip. For it says in Sura 24:4: "Those who accuse married women of unfaithfulness, but cannot procure four eye-witnesses, those you shall flog with eighty strokes of the whip and never again accept any evidence from them; they are godless, unless they afterwards repent and improve." In the case mentioned it was impossible to obtain witnesses, which Muḥammad was quite aware of. It is obvious that we cannot know how 'Ā'ishah had taken the situation, but it is nevertheless very characteristic that she exclaimed, when she heard Muḥammad's revelation, "By Allah, I considered myself much too humble that God for my sake should reveal a Qur'ān which should be repeated in the prayers of the faithful; I only hoped that Muḥammad should be convinced of my innocence in a vision."

This example is so extreme that many think that Muḥammad's revelations are here dragged down to such a level that they can no longer believe unconditionally in his honesty. I also think that we can see by several of his pronouncements, that his associates have not always taken his revelations equally seriously. On a certain occasion indignation was aroused by his having intercourse with a slave, but when

he then got the revelation of the word, "Thou mayest take to thyself whom thou wilt" (33:51), then 'Ā'ishah exclaimed, "I think that thy Lord is somewhat quick in fulfilling thy wishes." She obviously was not entirely convinced that it was something the prophet received.

One can also see an attempt at criticism in a very striking remark of the Caliph 'Uthmān when once, after the prophet's death, a difficult situation arose in which the persons concerned did not know what to do. 'Uthmān then remarked, "If Muḥammad had been alive, he would have had a revelation." On the other hand, I must stress that this criticism of Muḥammad from his associates only appears very faintly. We can be certain that such criticism was only directed at single cases, and that there was no doubt concerning his sacred mission. When non-Muslims regard the matter more soberly, it is due to the fact that their moral conceptions are different from those of the Arabs. But the prophet was taken to task by the most important of all his friends, the man who in many respects was far more intelligent than the prophet himself, and who was of just as much importance as he for the future of Islam. I am referring to 'Umar. This highly-gifted, sober, unusually critical personality, who intellectually was above all the other members of the prophet's circle, could certainly criticize the prophet. But, as Buhl has pointed out, we have not the least reason to suppose that he doubted Muḥammad's sincerity in the central point, i.e., with reference to his call to be the prophet of Allah. 'Umar attached himself to Muḥammad in the difficult period in Mecca previous to the time when he had had so much success that joining him could be due to clever calculation. In the question of Muḥammad's honesty 'Umar's faith in him therefore weighs heavily in his favor, in any case in the first period.

Nevertheless there are unfortunate things enough to put one's finger on. The decisive thing for us is, of course, how we shall regard the revelations which gave confirmation of his wishes. It is difficult to deny that he now and again played a part and arranged prophetical ecstasies which those

around him could scarcely distinguish from the real ecstasies. But Buhl has warned us against taking it as a general solution. He thinks that little by little, it was possible for Muḥammad to call forth these pathological conditions without realizing it and without noticing any difference in objectivity between the paroxysms thus produced and the earlier genuine ones. Such a hysterical person's spiritual habits are much too complicated phenomena for anyone to be able, as a matter of course, to apply simple logic, and judge him as one would judge a normal person. I think that Buhl is on the right track and especially I think that we must lay much weight on Muḥammad's religious powers having been much more strongly developed than his morals; that is why we cannot take it for granted that his conspicuous moral weakness makes it impossible for him to believe in his own sacred call.

We who only know Muḥammad's word through the Qur'ān will find it quite incomprehensible that he was able to make as great an impression on his contemporaries as he did. The tiring repetitions and the muddled style cause most people to give up reading the book to its end. Muḥammad's great success in his own time can only be explained when we connect it with his charm and strong and winning personality, which had an enormous influence over others. It made his adherents tolerate his faults and moral deficiencies and believe in the teachings which according to his own account, he got from Allah while we can see that there is nothing, or next to nothing, original in his message, but only loans from Jewry and Christendom adapted to "an easy religion" (to use his own words) and well-qualified to be understood and practiced by even the very lowest of all mankind on earth.

E. Hammershaimb

Aarhus, Denmark

THE SECTS AND ISLAM

A central antinomy has run through the religious thought of Islam even as through Christian religious thought. In Christian thought Providence as the basic metaphysical presupposition of the Christian world-view stands over against man's free-will, morally demanded for the sake of moral responsibility, and proved empirically apparently by self-examination and propounded also as the metaphysical ground for the existence of evil and the reason of all inconsistency and injustice. In Islamic thought the doctrine of *qadr*, that God alone has the power to create and produce things, stands over against man's free-will as an ethical demand and an empirical fact, if not as the cause and explanation of evil.

But Islam did not face, or even recognize this contradiction in the beginning. The early controversies, which divided the Muslim community into various sects in Umayyad days were the outcome of differences concerning the true nature of the faith *(al-īmān)*. Was it, as the Murji'ites maintained, simply "knowledge and confession of God together with knowledge and confession of His apostle and of what he had brought from God?"[1] Or was it, as the Khārijites believed, "every duty imposed by God upon His creatures, so that every great sin is unbelief, if not polytheism?"[2] Or was it again, as with the Shī'ites, the confession of a divinely appointed Imam as the one and only authority in every matter, lay or religious?[3]

Orthodox Islam repudiated the Shī'ite definition absolutely. Muḥammad was the seal of the Prophets; and the Qur'ān is God's Word, which "cleareth up everything" (Surah XVI:91), "a gathering wherein is the knowledge of the first and the last" (LVI:49). Against the authority of the Shī'ite *Imāms* the Orthodox, with the Murji'ites, set that of the agreement of the Muslim Community, the Consensus Ecclesiae,[4] disowning thereby also the Khārijites' reliance on the independent judgment of their *'ulamā'*, or jurists.[5] They rejected also the Murji'ite conception of the Faith as simple knowledge and confession, and the Khārijite comprehension of it as obedience to a divine law and maintained that it was both belief and works, knowledge in the heart and confession with the tongue and performance of the duties.[6] But they confined the essential duties to the five ac-

[1] *Die Dogmatischen Lehren der Anhaenger des Islam* von Abu'l-Hasan . . . Al-Ash'ari (Bibliotheca Islamica, Teil I). ed. H. Ritter. Constantinople, 1929 (hereafter cited as R.) p. 138, l. 12; cf. p. 132, l. 5 ff; p. 135, l. 8; p. 137, l. 8.

[2] R. p. 105, l. 3; p. 110, l. 13.

[3] R. pp. 5-34. cf. Shahrastānī's *Kitāb al-milal wa'l-niḥal*, ed. C. Cureton (hereafter cited as C). I, p. 16, l. 2.

[4] R. p. 135, l. 8; p. 137, l. 6.

[5] R. p. 110, l. 1; cf. p. 113, l. 6; p. 90, l. 8 and C. p. 91. l. 14.

[6] C. I, p. 73, l. 2.

cepted practices of Islam, ablutions, the five daily prayers, alms-giving, the fast in Ramaḍān and the pilgrimage to Mecca if at all possible.

The orthodox definition of the Faith may be regarded as a Murji'ite victory, even if it does not wholly conform to Ibn Mas'ūd's dictum that "true knowledge is the whole of the faith."[7] The emphasis at least is on belief rather than on works. But the Khārijite understanding of the faith as a rule of life, or conformity to the revealed will of God, lived on in orthodox circles, as the various schools of law indicate. It also crops up in Mu'tazilite definitions of the Faith:[8] and it may also have influenced the early Muslim ascetical movement. For the Khārijites are described by the Ash'arite, al-Shahrastānī, as "People of fasting and prayer";[9] and they were renowned apparently for their devoutness and morality and for the pious lamentation of their sins, and distinguished by their ascetic works and their contempt for the life of this world,[10] the same faith and practice preached by their contemporary and compatriot, Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, the father of the ascetic tradition in Islam, who based his conduct and doctrine on contempt for this transient life and corruptible world and with the Khārijites recommended the fear of God as the principle of worship.

The origin of the early sects, the Khārijites, Shī'ites and Murji'ites, has been attributed to political motives. Goldziher came to the conclusion that they arose through the injection of religious points of view into the political struggle over the Caliphate;[11] and Van Vloten believed that they were at first political parties simply and solely, the adherents of which turned their attention to the development of their doctrinal peculiarities after their political ambitions had been finally frustrated in the days of 'Abdulmalik (686-705).[12] It may be conceded that Van Vloten's contention has some justification, inasmuch as there was not much theological discussion in Islam before this period or for some time thereafter indeed. But Wellhausen felt that the political activities of the Khārijites at least were the product of their beliefs and piety;[13] and a study of Muslim history and historiography lends support to Wellhausen's thesis and leads to the

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[7] Al-Bukhari; ed. Krehl. I, p. 10, l. 10.

[8] R. pp. 266, l. 12-p. 270, l. 11.

[9] C. I, p. 86, l. 18 ff.

[10] cf. *Le Livre du Triomphe,* ed., H. S. Nyberg, p. 141, l. 9 ff; esp. p. 14ff. cf. also C. I, p. 18, l. 13 ff; Al-Baladhuri's *Ansāb al-ashrāf,* ed., Max Schloessinger, vol. IV B., p. 87, l. 22 ff; p. 90, l. 10 ff; p. 91, l. 20 ff. Tabari (ed. de Goeje) I, p. 2924; II, p. 440, l. 4 ff.

[11] *Vorlesungen über den Islam* (Heidelberg), pp. 208, cf. p. 88 and *Muhammedanische Studien,* II, p. 91.

[12] *Recherches sur le domination arabe* etc., pp. 35-38.

[13] *Oppositionsparteien* etc., p. 55.

conclusion that the rise of these sects should be sought in religious beliefs and loyalities rather than in political reasons.

When the Prophet died, he left his community without any directive, human or divine, regarding the succession to the leadership of the state, which he had created, or even respecting the principle and method of succession. The first problem which faced the young community, therefore, was the practical question of choosing a successor to the Prophet's position as head of the state: and this problem was treated generally as a political problem and solved, therefore, mainly by force.

The conflict over the Caliphate, which followed the murder of the third Caliph, 'Uthmān, is one of the chief themes of the historians of the first period of Islam; and the story of the early sects is told by them as part and parcel of that conflict. The stand of these sects on the Caliphate question and their embroilment in the numerous civil wars and uprisings occupy the attention of the historians to the virtual exclusion of all other aspects of their life and thought: and this unilateral description of their advent on the historical scene undoubtedly influenced the presentation and interpretation of their origin and development by the later historians of religion.

For al-Shahrastānī (1086-1153), writing in the first half of the twelfth century, a Khārijite was anyone who rebelled against a legitimate Caliph, upon whom the Community had agreed:[14] and the Khārijite heresy consisted of two innovations, in the first place, their belief that the Imāmate need not be restricted to the Quraysh, but that anyone whom they appointed, and who acted justly and avoided tyranny, was Imām, so long as he did not change his ways and depart from the truth, and in the second place, that 'Alī sinned in assenting to arbitration in his conflict with Mu'āwiya, since he named men as judges, and judgment belongs to God alone.[15] The Shī'ites, says al-Shahrastānī, were the partisans of 'Alī, who maintained that the Imāmate was his by the express testament, or disposition, of the Prophet, and that it should not depart from his progeny.[16]

Al-Shahrastānī's general characterization of these sects shows that he conceived of their defection from the Community as springing from their repudiation of the catholic doctrine of the Caliphate, in which view he has been followed by most Western scholars. But his statement that the Khārijites believed that "anyone whom they appointed, and *who acted justly and avoided tyranny,* was Imām, be he slave or free, Nabataean or Quraysh, *so long as he did not change his ways and depart from the truth,*" which has been cited as evidence

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[14] C. I, p. 85, l. 10.
[15] C. I, p. 87, ll. 2-9.
[16] C. I, p. 108; ll. 17-18. cf. p. 85, ll. 17-18 on the Murji'ites.

of their democratic character, bears witness rather to the essentially ethical-religious grounds of Khārijite thought and action on the Caliphate. Two centuries earlier al-Ash'arī (873-935), one of the founders of orthodoxy, said of the Khārijite sect, the 'Ibāḍites, that they "do not approve of opposing the people (the orthodox) with the sword, but *do approve of the deposing of unjust Imāms and the precluding of their being Imāms by any means possible, by the sword or without the sword.*" Of the Khārijites in general he reports that they "hold that the Imāmate belongs either to the Quraysh or to the non-Quraysh, *provided that he who occupies it is worthy of it, but that they do not approve of the Imāmate of a tyrant*";[17] and about the same time the Mu'tazilite al-Khayyāṭ wrote that their rejection of the Caliphs 'Uthmān, Mu'āwiya and 'Alī, was *based upon their judgment that these Caliphs had departed from the Word of God and the Sunnah of the Prophet.*[18]

With the revolts of Mukhtār the Thaqifite in the days of 'Abdalmalik (686-705) and Ibn Zubayr and of Zaid b. 'Alī in the reign of Hishām (724-743) the Shī'ite conception of the Imāmate emerged clear and became fixed. In a letter to Yūsuf b. 'Umar the Caliph Hishām declares that "Shī'ite worship of God is worship of man";[19] and not long thereafter the Yemenite Khārijite Chief Abū Ḥazm spoke his mind in Madina regarding the Shī'ites and said: "Their religion consists in allegiance to a family, whom they obey in everything which they announce, be it right or wrong, false or true. They await a new era through the return of a dead man and believe in a resurrection before the Last Day. They ascribe knowledge of the mysteries to a creature. . . . They rely in their religion on an Arab family and believe that their client-relationship to these patrons raises them above and beyond good works and saves them from the punishment of their sins."[20]

Khārijite and Shī'ite thought and action in regard to the Caliphate sprang evidently from religious convictions and can only be explained in the light of these convictions. The Murji'ite position is not so clear. But the equivocality of their attitude is probably due to the fact that the principle which they applied to establish title to the throne[21] was the same as that by which they affirmed the truth of articles of faith[22] and judged of the heterodoxy of their fellows,[23]

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[17] R. I, p. 125, l. 1 ff.

[18] *Le Livre du Triomphe,* ed. H. S. Nyberg, p. 140, l. 9 ff. cf. also R. I, p. 86 and the *Kāmil* of Ibn al-Athīr, III, p. 134.

[19] Tabari II, p. 1682, l. 5.

[20] *Kitāb al-Aghānī,* XX, 107.

[21] cf. *Die Sekten der Schi'a von* al-Hasan . . . An-Naubakhti. (Bibliotheca Islamica, Bd. 4) ed., H. Ritter, pp. 14-17.

[22] R. p. 135, l. 8 ff; cf. p. 137, l. 6 ff.

[23] R. p. 144, l. 1 ff.

namely, the Consensus of the Community, which was essentially the ancient Arab tribal principle accepted axiomatically by the mass of the Muslims and now set up as a pillar of the faith as well as of society. And whether this principle was recognized as valid in the religious sphere, or in the political, in the first place, or what seems just as likely, in both spheres about the same time, it is impossible with our present information to determine.

But the Murji'ites were not such supine slaves of blind authority as they have sometimes been described. Murji'ites fought for Yazīd b. Muhallab against Yazīd II, and were implicated in the rebellion of Ḥārith b. Suraij in Khurāsān in the days of Hishām (724-743);[24] and the Ghailānites of Syria, the followers of Abū Marwān Ghailān al-Dimishqī, who was crucified by Hishām, were Qadarites,[25] upholders of the doctrine of free-will, which the Umayyads, even the pious 'Umar the Second (717-720), found so obnoxious, and the adherents of which they persecuted so savagely.[26] The Murji'ite conception of the faith as knowledge, or belief, and their criterion for the truth of its articles as also for the heterodoxy of fellow-Muslims, namely, the Consensus, ranged them very often on the side of the Ahl al-Ḥadīth, or of the Ḥashwiyya,[27] followers of tradition and custom and coarse-grained in their religious anticipations and imaginings, but the action which they then took was as much inspired by their religious sentiments as was their later opposition of Umayyad injustice to the non-Arab clients. At least they were not blind loyalists, but took their stand on political matters as on those of faith on definite principles.

The creeds formulated by the Murji'ites and Khārijites are practically identical in content. The believer should confess knowledge of God and of His apostle, and of the divine precepts made known to the Apostle.[28] The body of belief does not vary much. But religion, or the faith, meant for the Khārijites the accomplishment of these precepts. For the Murji'ites on the other hand, religion was essentially intellectual assent, and the canon of obligation as regards performance of the duties was the Consensus of the Community.[29]

The predestinarian-free-will problem was first raised in Islam, as recorded debates between Muslims and Christians in Umayyad times, whether they be genuine or not, show, in the form of the question,

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[24] Tabari II, 1349 and 1595.

[25] R. pp. 150 and 154.

[26] cf. *Ibn Taghri Birdi*, ed., Juynboll and Matthes, vol. I, p. 221, l. 11 ff. and p. 222, l. 7 ff; Abū'l-Mahasin I, p. 221; Ibn Qutayba's *Kitāb al-ma'ārif*, p. 224; Tabari II, 1733 and 1777; C. p. 105.

[27] cf. *Naubakhti's Sekten der Schi'a*, ed., H. Ritter, p. 6, l. 7 ff.

[28] cf. R. p. 90, l. 8; p. 114, l. 1; p. 114, l. 9; p. 115, l. 9; p. 135, l. 8; p. 137, l. 6; p. 138, l. 12, and C. p. 91, l. 14; p. 95, l. 15; p. 94, l. 12. cf. also the Zaidites of the Shi'ites, R. p. 52.

[29] R. 135, l. 8; 138, l. 6.

"Can God be the cause of evil?" The Christians, and presumably like-minded Muslims also, answered, "No, the evil is from our negligence and the devil's cunning. Whoever makes God the cause of evil makes Him an unjust God, punishing for acts which He has decreed." And to the further inquiry, "Are you then a free agent?" they replied, "The free agent is made by God," which meant probably, as with Philo, that God has delegated to man the power to choose and act freely.[30]

But the Qadarites of the Umayyad period, in whose ranks must be numbered a great many of the Khārijites and Shī'ites and some Murji'ites as well,[31] did not seek apparently to demonstrate the truth of the doctrine on rational grounds, but by the evidence of scripture, where it is written that God "shall lay on no-one a burden beyond his power."[32] "If truth lay with the predestinarians," declares a letter ascribed to Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, "God would not have said (XLI:40), 'Do what ye will,' He would have said, 'Do what I have fore-ordained.' "[33]

Al-Ash'arī usually represents the sectarian upholders of the doctrine of freewill, Khārijite, Shī'ite or Murji'ite, as followers of the Mu'tazilite doctrine of *"qadr,"*[34] the most general statement of which is that God has not created unbelief and sins, nor any act of any one else,[35] which is the negative form probably of the doctrine of the Eastern Christian Church, which taught that God has delegated actions to the creatures and has given them the ability for every duty imposed upon them. The *Kanz al-'ummāl* says that "the Qadarites borrowed the doctrine from the Christians."[36] But for the early exponents of the doctrine of free-will in Islam, and for the later Mu'tazilites as well, the root of the matter lay in the question, "Can God do evil?" "Has God power *(qudrah)* over injustice and tyranny?";[37] and the framing of the question imposed the answer. For, as Muḥammad al-Rāzī points out in his refutation of the Mu'tazilite position, men's acts are things and are included, therefore, in the "everything" which according to God's own Word He creates.[38]

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[30] See Migne, *Patrologia Graeca,* XCIV, 1590 ff; . XCVI, 1335 ff; 1530 ff and 1587 ff. cf. *Kanz al-'Ummal* I, 35, no. 645 and 36, no. 665. cf. also C., the third introduction, p. 5, l. 14 ff and especially p. 7, ll. 6-7.

[31] See H. A. Wolfson's *Philo* (Cambridge, Mass., 1947) chap. VIII. cf. R. pp. 93, l. 7-97; 104, l. 6 ff; 107, l. 13-108; pp. 25 and 51; pp. 150 and 154. cf. C. p. 94, l. 5 from the bottom; p. 96, l. 1; p. 96, l. 7-101.

[32] VII: 40. cf. LXIV: 64 and LXV: 7. cf. *Kitāb al-Aghānī* XV. 64, 20.

[33] *Der Islam,* XXI, p. 69, l. 21 ff; cf. p. 82, l. 1 ff. The letter defends the doctrine of free-will by scriptural texts.

[34] cf. R. p. 93. l. 7; p. 104, l. 6; p. 115 at the bottom; p. 154.

[35] R. p. 224, l. 10.

[36] I, 36, nos 652 and 668.

[37] R. p. 200, l. 3.

[38] *Mafātiḥ al-Ghaib,* Cairo, 1308 A.H., VII, 785-787.

The religious thinkers of the ninth and tenth centuries in Islam inherited the problems of the earlier generations and also some answers to these problems, which by that time had become established as the authoritative teaching of the Book and the Prophet.[39] But these problems and answers were now to be discussed, as al-Shahrastānī intimates, not on the basis of authoritative statements derived from the Qur'ān or Tradition, but by the rules of the dialectic and in the light of Greek philosophical ideas, of which Mu'tazilites had little knowledge in al-Shahrastānī's judgment.[40]

The rise of the Mu'tazilite sects, or parties, is traditionally associated with the Khārijite-Murji'ite controversy over the status of a believing sinner, was he, or was he not, to be accepted as a believer?, to which problem Wāṣil b. 'Aṭā' is reported to have given the answer: "I do not think that he who commits a great sin is a believer absolutely, nor an unbeliever absolutely, he is in a stage between these two stages, neither a believer, nor an unbeliever,"[41] a position which was to solve many questions in Islam.

As Wāṣil's answer suggests, the problem of the Faith *(al-īmān)*, which divided the Khārijites and Murji'ites was still alive: and the Mu'tazilites, as might be expected from their ascetic tendencies, accepted the Khārijite definition of the faith, even if they rejected their view that every great sin is unbelief. Faith, according to Abū'l-Hudhayl, Hishām al-Fuwaṭī, 'Abbād b. Sulaymān, al-Naẓẓām and al-Jubbā'ī, consists of all the prescribed duties, and in the case of the three former, of the supererogatory duties also. But they postulated two kinds of faith, a faith *in* God, to abandon any part of which is unbelief,—to deny the unity, for example, or to compare God with His creatures, or to charge His judgment with injustice, or to belie His declaration *(khabar)*, or to reject what the majority of Muslims accept on the authority of the Prophet—, and a faith *to* God, to abandon which is sin, but not unbelief,—to give up prayer, for example, or the fast of Ramaḍān, or the pilgrimage, although with the Murji'ite Abū Ma'ādh al-Tūminī they too held that he who renounces such divine ordinances, because he disavows and abjures them, denies God, but that he does so only by virtue of his disavowal and abjuration.[42] With their dialectic the Mu'tazilites sought to resolve the contradiction which lay in their acceptance of the morally dictated Khārijite conception of the Faith along with the historically vindicated and religiously sanctioned Murji'ite attitude towards professing members of the Community, who were backsliders in practice

[39] C. p. 19, l. 4 from the bottom, also the Traditions.
[40] C. p. 18, l. 2 ff; p. 59, ll. 12-14.
[41] C. p. 33, l. 8 ff. cf. p. 55, ll. 9-12.
[42] R. p. 266, l. 12-p. 270, l. 11 and p. 139, l. 14 ff.

but not in belief; and thereby they laid the ground for the justification of the later orthodox position.[43]

But that which especially characterizes the Mu'tazilites and justifies in part the application of a common name to the many different schools and systems, which are brought under that name, was their adoption and defense of the Qadarite thesis that God does not create the evil, but only the good: and it was this corollary, or implication, of the doctrine of free-will, or this statement of it, and not the fact of free-will itself, which the old orthodox party, the Ahl al-Ḥadīth, and the later orthodox theologians repudiated and attacked so bitterly.

"The Qadarites," says al-Ash'arī, among whom he here includes the Mu'tazilites, "maintain and are convinced that the creatures create the evil. . . . They believe that they alone have power over their works and not their Lord, that they are independent of their Lord, and that they control what is harmful and what is helpful to them and not God."[44] "The Mu'tazilites are unanimous," he says again in his *Maqālāt,* "in the belief that God does not create unbelief and sins, except one of them, who maintains that God has created them by creating their names and judgments."[45] "They deny that God wills sins, or obedience."[46]

In the eyes of the old orthodox and of the later orthodox theologians this Qadarite-Mu'tazilite thesis contradicted the most proper and essential attribute of God, His power,[47] by which alone creation, or the origination of things, is possible, including men's acts. "There is nothing in the world, good or evil," asserts al-Ash'arī in his *Ibānah,* except what God has willed. Things are by the will of God, and no-one can do anything, before God causes him to do it. . . . There is no creator except God. The works of man are created by God and predestined. Men have not the power to create anything, but are themselves created."[48] And two centuries later al-Shahrastānī stated the philosophical basis of the orthodox position. "Nothing that is possible in its existence," he writes, "can originate anything at all." . . . "There is no Creator except the Necessarily Existent. The other causes are prepared to receive existence, but are not originators of real existence."[49]

But it is clear from al-Ash'arī's own exposition of Mu'tazilite

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[43] cf. Al-Ash'ari's *Kitāb al-Ibānah,* Cairo, 1368 A.H., p. 10, l. 7 from the bottom and R. p. 293, l. 2 ff.

[44] The *Ibānah,* pp. 7-8.

[45] R. p. 227, l. 15p cf. p. 228, ll. 1, 3; p. 257, l. 8; p. 267, l. 7; C. p. 50, ll. 11-13; p. 51, ll. 13-15.

[46] R. p. 185, l. 15.

[47] cf. p. 72, l. 1.

[48] p. 9.

[49] C. p. 71, ll. 14 and 17.

thought that most of the Mu'tazilites never contemplated the attribution to man of the creation of his own acts except in a very special sense. On page 228 of his *Maqālāt* he informs us that "the Mu'tazilites disputed with one-another as to whether it is said that man creates his act, or not. Some of them thought that the terms "doer" *(fā'il)* and creator *(khāliq)* are identical in meaning, but did not apply these terms to man in their absolute sense, because that had been forbidden. Others said that to create is to act *(fi'l)* without instrument or member, which is impossible for man. And still others said that to create means that the act takes place as determined, and that everyone whose act takes place as determined is the creator of it, whether he be eternal or created,"[50] which is a truncated form of the Aristotelian definition of freedom.

The various Mu'tazilite conceptions of man's "creation" of his acts come to light in their discussion of the term, *istitā'ah*, "ability" or "possibility" defined as the power *(qudrah)* for an act or its opposite.[51] Al-Naẓẓām, whom al-Shahrastānī characterizes as a philosopher rather than a theologian, held that man is capable in himself and not through a capacity which is not himself, and that a man is able in and of himself to do that which is his affair, until some infirmity strikes him.[52] But most of the Mu'tazilites denied this and maintained that man is capable through a capacity which is not himself, but which is an accident.[53] The majority thought that accidents persist, but some rejected the persistence of the accidents and declared that an accident does not endure for two moments of time.[54]

Most of the Mu'tazilites agreed that Ability, or Possibility, is before the act, and that a man has no need of it for the act in the moment of the existence of the act to do through it what he has done, but that he has need of it, on the other hand, since the existence of an act in a dead, impotent member is impossible.[55] "Ability," said Abū Hudhail, "is necessary before the act, but when the act exists, a man has no need of it at all."[56]

The majority of them also thought that an act takes place by virtue of Ability, but that Ability is not a cause of the act.[57] And those who denied the persistence of the accidents believed that an act exists in the second moment of time by virtue of the preceding,

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[50] P. 228, l. 5. cf. p. 195, l. 3 for the second definition, and for the last cf. p. 195, ll. 4-5 and C. p. 53, l. 19. Al-Jubbā'ī and his school accepted the last definition, i.e., the Basrians.

[51] R. p. 230, l. 12.

[52] R. p. 229, l. 3 ff. cf. also p. 229, l. 15 on Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir.

[53] R. p. 229, ll. 9, 13.

[54] R. p. 230, l. 5 ff.

[55] R. p. 232, l. 7.

[56] R. p. 232, l. 1, Al-Naẓẓām, cf. R. p. 229, l. 7.

[57] R. p. 235, l. 16 and p. 230, l. 13.

[now] non-existent power *(qudrah)*, but that an act's coming to be is not possible in conjunction with inability, and that God creates a power in the second moment of time so that the act takes place by virtue of the preceding power.[58] But some of the later Mu'tazilites maintained that the power *(qudrah)* is along with the act and defined Ability as the being fit *(ṣāliḥ)* for a thing, or for leaving it alone, in the moment of its coming-to-be.[59]

"God's will," said al-Ash'arī according to al-Shahrastānī, "is one and eternal, and all acts which are willed, whether they belong to Him peculiarly, or to His servants, are dependent on it in respect of their being created by Him, but not in respect of their being acquired by them; and from this it follows that God has created everything good and evil, beneficial and harmful."[60] A few lines later al-Shahrastānī continues: "And according to his school the imposing [as a duty] of that for which there is no competence, is possible, for the reason which we have mentioned. And since in his opinion *Ability does not persist two moments of time, in the moment of obligation he who is obligated is entirely incapable* (not *qādiran*); and since he who is obligated will never be capable to produce what is commanded him, in the case of such a one who has no power *(qudrah)* at all to act, the possibility of that is absurd. . . ."

"But al-Ash'arī maintained that the servant is capable *('qādiran)* of his acts, since a man finds in and for himself a necessary distinction between movements of trembling caused by fear, or convulsions, and those of choice and will, the distinction arising from the fact that movements of choice happen by virtue of power *(taḥta'l-qudrah)* and depend upon the choice of one who is capable *('qādir):* and from this it follows that that which is acquired is determined by the created power and happens by virtue of it."

But according to al-Ash'arī's fundamental assumption "the created power has no effect upon the production [of the acts], since the mode of the coming-to-be [of things] is a single determination indifferentiated with respect to substance and accident. And if it (the created power) influenced the determination of the coming-to-be [of the acts, which are accidents], it would [also] influence the coming-to-be of everything created, until it would be competent *(ṣāliḥ)* to produce colors, tastes and smells and also to produce substances and bodies, and so lead to the possibility that the heavens and earth had come about by a created power."

"But God has made it His custom to create in consequence of the created power, or by virtue of it; and the resulting act is in conjunc-

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[58] R. p. 230, l. 5.
[59] R. p. 230, l. 15.
[60] C. p. 68, l. 9.

tion with it, when the servant wills it and devotes himself to it. This act is named "acquirement." It is a creation on God's part in respect of its production and causing to be, and an acquirement on the servant's part, since it happens by virtue of his power *(qudrah)*."

All power belongs to God, and all acts, those of His servants as well as His own, are produced by His power. But God gives His creature, man, a power of choice, to do or not to do; and man's use of this power gives an act, as al-Bāqillānī explains,[61] a special form through its connection with the act. Movements, for example, are all created by God, but man's choice may make them movements to the right or left, up or down, etc., and especially it may make them movements of obedience or disobedience, leading to reward or punishment. That God creates this power in man does not annul man's responsibility for the act which is consequent to, or by virtue of, his use of it.

Al-Ash'arī's conception of human action and freedom was evidently foreshadowed in the theories of those Basrah Mu'tazilites, who conceived of Ability as a non-persisting accident, and some of whom latterly supposed that it is in conjunction with the act. His doctrine of "acquirement" was also advanced in Mu'tazilite circles. Al-Najjār and the school of Rayy according to al-Shahrastānī agreed with the Mu'tazilites in denying the divine attributes, but accepted the opinion of the Ṣifātites (the upholders of the attributes) in regard to the creation of men's acts. "God," said al-Najjār, "is the Creator of the acts of His servants, the good and the evil, the pleasing and the shameful, but the servant 'acquires' them." And he affirmed an influence for the created power and named it "acquirement" *(kasb)*, just as al-Ash'arī affirmed it.[62] And al-Ash'arī himself reports of al-Najjār and his followers, the Ḥusaynites, that they believed that the acts of the servants are created by God, but that they are the doers *(fā'ilūn)* of them, . . . that Ability cannot precede an act, and that help *('aun)* from God comes in the moment of the act along with the act, and that it (the help) is the "Ability," that two acts are not done with one "Ability," but that each act has an "Ability," which comes along with it, when it happens."[63]

The orthodox explanation of sin as God's abandonment of the sinner was also current with the Mu'tazilites, most of whom thought it possible that God's "Leading astray" *(iḍlāl)* of the sinner might mean His abandonment *(tark)* of His creation (or causing) of kindness *(luṭf)*, and of His right guidance and of the support of that which He does for the faithful.[64] Some of them indeed conceded that

[61] C. p. 69, l. 15-p. 70, l. 10.

[62] C. p. 61, last line; p. 62, l. 6; cf. p. 63, l. 11 on Dirār.

[63] R. p. 283, l. 1 ff; cf. R. p. 199, l. 7 on al-Shaḥḥān.

[64] cf. R. p. 261, ll. 12-14; cf. p. 262, l. 15; p. 264, l. 5 ff; also p. 200, ll. 3-6 and p. 239, ll. 11-12 on 'Abbād.

God has dominion over injustice and tyranny and even went as far as to grant that He can do wrong and injustice.[65] But the majority of them stoutly denied that God creates unbelief and sins, or does wrong, or provides what is forbidden.[66] "These are unbelievers," said Abū'l-Hudhail, "who think that God creates injustice, and wills foolishness and imposes [duties on] cripples and chronic invalids, for in their thoughts they judge God foolish and charge Him with injustice."[67]

The Mu'tazilites have justly been named the People of Justice and of Unity. They have not been called in any Muslim source the People of Reason. But for a few notable exceptions they were not philosophers, nor even well versed in the dialectic.[68] They were theologians, *mutakallims,* dealing with the various religious questions, which had been raised in the Community, such as the status of a believing sinner, the origin of evil, the nature of revelation, and the character of the divine unity, problems which they inherited from preceding generations of devout religious thinkers, or which were inherent in the revelation which they accepted unreservedly; and their approach to these problems was, in the first place, through the moral sense, which directed and underwrit their choice of the philosophical notions which came their way and seemed to give an ethical as well as an intelligent solution. They did not seek a rational explanation of God, man and the world. They had the explanation contained in revelation; and their only duty was to defend and clarify, to define and make intelligible the doctrines delivered in revelation and based on Tradition.

To conceive of God as the author of evil, or as unjust to His creatures, infringed their moral sense; and to the findings of moral sense can also be reckoned the conviction of many Mu'tazilites that God has created His servants only for their good, and that He must purpose for them the highest of stations,[69] and even their faith in the power of human reason to achieve a knowledge of God, or of good and evil, or of the law, without revelation.[70] For to create creatures with intelligences and deny them that would be unjust as well as unreasonable.[71]

But the rejection by the Mu'tazilites of the eternity of the Qur'ān, or of God's Speech, and of the divine attributes may seem, at first hand, to have stemmed from another motive altogether. It was not

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[65] R. p. 200, ll. 3-6. cf. p. 239, ll. 11-12 on 'Abbād.

[66] R. p. 227, l. 10; R. p. 202, l. 9; cf. p. 200, ll. 7, 12p p. 201, ll. 1, 3; p. 202, l. 15; and R. p. 257, l. 8.

[67] R. p. 267, l. 7.

[68] cf. C. p. 59, ll. 12-14.

[69] R. p. 251, l. 41 p. 252, l. 13; p. 244, l. 5.

[70] C. p. 40, l. 2 from the bottom; p. 45, l. 15; p. 50, l. 2; p. 55, l. 5.

[71] cf. C. p. 63, l. 17 ff. on Dirār; also R. p. 249, l. 12 ff.

wholly, however, or even largely, the dictate of reason that moved them to establish the unity and simplicity of the divine nature by denying the attributes including Speech, nor was it wholly, or even largely, the apologetic urge to defend the Muslim confession of the unity of God against Chistian Trinitarianism and Manichaean dualism. Rather was it to a high degree due to a revulsion from the crass anthropomorphic characterization of God current among the Ahl al-Ḥadīth and Ḥashwiyyah and also some Shī'ite sects.[72] who attributed to God in the words of Abū'l-Hudhayl foolishness and injustice and thought of Him in terms unworthy of Him.

The question of the eternity of the Qur'ān belongs to the general problem of the divine attributes. But the controversy centering in it did not deal with abstracts, such as knowledge, power and wisdom, but with a quite concrete thing, the written or recited Qur'ān. The eternity, or as it was usually put, the uncreatedness, of the Qur'ān seems to have been accepted fairly early in Islam,[73] by the first half of the eighth century at the latest. But with the restoration of the traditionalists, the old orthodox party, to power under Mutawakkil (847-861), the upholders of the doctrine no longer accepted as proof of orthodoxy the simple declaration that the Qur'ān is eternal and uncreated. They demanded to know what a man thought the uncreated Qur'ān to be. Did he conceive of the Qur'ān as being in reality the thought, or will, of God, that only found expression in the Book? Or was it the Book itself, the very text, which God communicated to the Prophet "in clear Arabic speech,"[74] and which was recited in prayer?

The orthodox maintained that Speech is an eternal attribute of God, just like knowledge and power and the other essential attributes, and that His revelations, therefore, which are His activity as Speaker, are from everlasting there. The Mu'tazilites saw in this anthropomorphic attribute, assigned to God and incorporated in the Qur'ān, an eternal being beside God, such as they imagined the Christian Logos to be; and their reaction to and rejection of this corporealization of the divine nature probably influenced their attitude to and discussion of the divine attributes in general.

The problem of the attributes arises from the misconception which has been named the fallacy of misplaced concreteness; and some of the Mu'tazilites either recognized the error, or avoided it by simple common sense. One of them, in answer to the question, "Are the attributes of God things, or not?" said, "I do not say that knowledge is a thing, nor do I say that the attributes are things. For

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[72] cf. R. p. 207, l. 1-p. 217; p. 31 ff.
[73] See the statement of John of Damascus in *Patrologia Graeca*, XCVI, 1341.
[74] cf. XXXIX:29.

when I say that the Creater with His attributes is a thing, I do not need to say that His attributes are things."[75]

With other Mu'tazilites we find solutions to the attribute problem, which appear later in mediaeval Christian thought. The majority of the Mu'tazilites maintained that God knows, wills, is powerful, etc., in Himself *(bi-nafsihi)*,[76] that is, through His essence. Abū'l-Hudhayl said that "God knows through a knowledge, which is He, and is powerful through a power, which is He."[77] Al-Naẓẓām said, "My saying 'knowing' is an affirmation of His essence and a denial of ignorance in Him."[78] Al-Ash'arī cites the Mu'tazilites in general as declaring that "the names and attributes [of God] are statements, our statements that God knows, is powerful etc."[79] But more important still to the student of Islam and the history of its thought is the fact that 'Abdullah b. Kullāb gives the very solution which was accepted by al-Ash'arī and which has become the orthodox doctrine. "The names and attributes of God," said 'Abdullah b. Kullāb, "belong to His essence. They are not God, nor other than God."[80] Nor should it be ignored that Ibn Ḥazm accused al-Ash'arī of defiling the pure doctrine of Islam by introducing into it the states, or modes *(aḥwāl)*, of the Mu'tazilite, Abū Hāshim, who held that God knows through His essence in the sense that He has a state, "knowing," which can be known in distinction to His essence, but which is only known along with His essence and never apart from it. That is, the attributes are never known of and for themselves, but only in conjunction with the Essence.[81]

Orthodox Islam owes much of its theological system to the doctrinal discussions of the Mu'tazilites. The distinction, for example, between God's decree *(qaḍā* or *qadar)*, which is His foreordination of all things, and which is prior to creation and final, and His power *(qadar* or *qaḍā)*, which is His execution of His decrees in time,[82] has its prototype in Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir's recognition of two kinds of divine willing, a willing with which God is described in His essence, and a willing with which He is described, which is one of His acts; and the first kind has no relation, Bishr maintained, to the sins of His servants.[83] And the collateral distinction between the divine will that determines the existence of things and God's good-pleas-

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[75] R. p. 171, l. 13; cf. p. 171, l. 16.
[76] R. p. 164, l. 13; p. 174, l. 4; p. 187, l. 14; cf. C. 55, last line on al-Jubbā'ī.
[77] R. p. 165, l. 5; cf. p. 188, l. 11 and C. p. 34, l. 9.
[78] R. p. 166, l. 16; cf. p. 173, l. 15; p. 174, l. 9.
[79] R. p. 172, l. 14.
[80] R. p. 169, l. 12; cf. p. 170, l. 15; p. 172, l. 7.
[81] cf. C. p. 56, l. 1 ff.
[82] cf. *Mafātiḥ al-Ghaib*, Muḥammad al-Rāzī, Cairo, 1308 A.H., vol. VII, pp. 785-787.
[83] R. p. 190, l. 5; C. p. 45, l. 5.

ure in what He commands in His Word, is found with al-Naẓẓām, who held that God's willing the production of things is His production of them, but that His willing the acts of His servants is His commanding them, and that the commanding of acts is not the acts.[84] Abū'l-Hudhayl also distinguished between the divine command that gives existence and the command that imposes duties.[85]

The fundamental assumptions of Islam are given in the Qur'ān: a God whose most essential attribute is power, since He is the creator, owner and sovereign of all things, a creation the only reason for which is God's will, and which is absolutely dependent upon His power, so that His creatures can do nothing of themselves apart from that power, and a revelation complete and fixed, which declares openly and finally everything which man need know concerning this mortal life and the future, eternal life, and publishes the law which God has established for man, obedience to which is his duty, and which is the only cord that binds men together in society and leads them to God.

Muḥammad felt, as some of his followers did, that man is free up to a point to follow God's law or reject it, just as he chooses. But these fundamental assumptions constrained Muslim piety to a conception of the world and of man and his destiny, that would not encroach upon God's power, or invalidate His revelation, or violate His law. The old orthodox party, the Ahl al-Ḥadith, held by them steadfastly and set them forth without regard to their consistency or philosophical implications. Orthodox Islam, schooled and equipped in the Mu'tazilite controversy, set them in a system which could be defended philosophically, and which gave an intelligible explanation of God, man and the world. But it left out much that was near and dear to the human heart. It justified God's ways to man, but it left man's ways unexplored. And the great weakness in orthodox Muslim thought is its neglect of what Pope declared was the proper study of man, namely, man.

WILLIAM THOMSON

Harvard University

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[84] R. p. 190, l. 12.

[85] C. p. 35, l. 3; cf. R. p. 178, l. 8 ff; also R. p. 189, l. 17 ff.

WOLFSON'S *PHILO**

This book forms the second part of the *"Structure and Growth of Philosophic Systems from Plato to Spinoza,"* the greater work planned on the hypothetico-deductive method called in Rabbinical terminology *pilpul.* These two volumes form the second part and the third we have already in two volumes, which are to be further expanded and revised, on *The Philosophy of Spinoza* (Harvard, 1934). "Other studies on philosophers following Philo, as well as a general introductory study on Greek philosophy, to the latter of which occasional references are made in the footnotes of this book, will appear at reasonably short intervals." The author indicates his purpose in the following terms: "The purpose of this book (i.e., on Philo) has been to delineate and depict the philosophy of Philo as it shaped itself in his own mind and in its own setting and to indicate briefly how in its main features it was the most dominant force in the history of philosophy down to the seventeenth century. . . . We have attempted here a fresh examination of Philo in relation to his predecessors and with a view to those who came after him—and this on the basis of texts which are fully deployed and studied" (p. viii).

A brief summary of the contents of these two volumes is as follows: First there is discussed the attitude of the Hellenistic Jews to Greek philosophy and religion, the concepts of "wisdom" in philosophy and revelation, Philo's own peculiar viewpoint (which gives the writer occasion to criticize Goodenough's theory of Philo as representing an Alexandrian Jewish Mystery cult in *By Light, Light: The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism)* that Greek religion was altogether corrupt, and lastly the various exegetical theories of the Alexandrian Jews.

The second chapter discusses philosophy as the handmaid of religion including the literal and allegorical interpretation of Scripture. Philo's views on the source of philosophy and revelation are shown, alternating between theories that Moses was the origin of Greek philosophy and that the latter was a gift direct from God to the Greeks as the Mosaic Law was to the Jews. This leads to the discussion of faith and reason as means to apprehend truth.

In the third chapter the subject is the preamble of faith, i.e., the scriptural basis consisting of doctrines of God's existence, Unity, Providence, Creation, the unity of creation, the theory of the world of ideas (the Muslim *'ālamu'l miṭhāl*) which he holds to be scrip-

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* Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam. By Harry Austryn Wolfson. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1947. Vol. 1, pp. xvi + 462; Vol. 2, pp. xiv + 531. $10.00.

tural, revelation and the eternity of the Law. Five of these he considers survived as dogmas in post-Philonic philosophical systems viz, God's existence, Unity, Providence, Creation, Revelation.

Under the next main heading, "God, the World of Ideas and The Logos," Philo's complicated mass of references to ideas, powers, the world of intelligibles, the relation between the Deity, the Logos and the Intelligibles, an alleged equivalence of Sophia and the Logos, a distinction between the Logos as instrument and as mediator with the consequent "fiction of intermediaries" are all discussed. The author identifies the "powers" with the "ideas" in Philo, and introduces the problem whether the powers are identical with the Divine Essence or incorporeal beings distinct from the Divine Essence (a favorite matter of debate at a much later date).

Chapter five deals with the Philonic conceptions of the creation and structure of the world and includes Philo's criticism of Aristotle and the Stoics, a section on the *Timaeus* and *Genesis,* that Philo amends Plato by denying the co-eternity of the ideas with God (though on I:290 one of the stages of the existence of ideas is said to be "from eternity they had existed as thoughts of God") and maintaining that they were created, as also the primal matter in which and from which the world was created, the concepts of Place, Time and Eternity and a denial that Philo believes in "eternal generation."

The following chapter turns to the subject of the Logos immanent, the laws of nature and miracles. Chapter seven discusses Souls, Angels and Immortality showing that the immanent Logos is not the Soul of the World, and dealing with incorporeal souls (the separate substances of later scholasticism), the concepts of animal and rational soul, the equation of immortality with resurrection and the distinction between an inferior immortality and that conferred by Divine Grace.

The eighth chapter is on freewill, miracles and freedom, choice of good and evil, and this completes the first volume. The first chapter of the second volume (chapter 9 of the whole) goes into the question of knowledge and prophecy, differentiates sensible, rational and prophetic knowledge, states the four functions of prophecy to be prediction, propitiation, legislation and vision of the incorporeal, classifies three types of prophecy as through the Divine Spirit, by the Divine Voice and through angels, in which we read "Angels are considered by him to be intermediaries of what he calls prophetic communications" which should be compared with I:372f on the angels as "immanent powers" and the section on "The fiction of intermediaries" (I:282ff). This is followed by a chapter on the proofs of God's existence.

The eleventh chapter is occupied with the discussion of the unknowability of God and the divine predicates, i.e., the Unity, simplicity and incorporeality of God, explains what is meant by saying that God is not qualified by attributes, the "unnameability" of God, divine properties, etc., and includes a valuable section on anthropomorphism and how Philo came to call the divine properties "powers" and a discussion of the "essence of the created powers." There follow three chapters on ethical theory, political theory and what is new in Philo.

This is a splendid achievement and any review of the whole must fall short of doing proper justice to the range of the material used and the deftness with which it is handled. We shall have occasion to say some adversely critical things later but the first thing one must say is that Professor Wolfson has put all students in his debt. His pages are full of suggestions which will be most fruitful to anyone seeking to fathom the processes of thought in the middle ages and for the student of Islam there is much here which will throw light on strange and perplexing problems. Professor Wolfson is an excellent guide to mediaeval thought and this and his other books will be almost indispensable for anyone who wishes to weave his way through the terrific mass of material which is presented for him from Jewish, Christian and Muslim sources. His knowledge is very wide and there is little of the literature with which he does not show some sort of acquaintance. His edition of the text of Crescas' *Critique of Aristotle* with a translation and notes and his two volumes on Spinoza had already made us aware of this. Ample evidence of his acute and penetrating understanding of the problems of philosophical theology and of his great learning is here before us and we are in his debt. It is abundantly plain that he has seized on the main essentials, the fundamental principles and problems and has achieved in his mind a plan of the whole system which is so far as it goes authentic. This system is also presented with clarity and simplicity in spite of all the complications in the mass of his material. It is a great achievement to have succeeded in analysing and synthesising even Philo, let alone all the rest of the material.

The method which Professor Wolfson has adopted is the Rabbinical *pilpul* method, otherwise called by him the hypothetico-deductive method. He explains this elsewhere. Before the Talmudic student is satisfied that he has the meaning of any statement he asks, "What does the author mean to say here?" If it seems too obvious he will ask why it was expressly said. When a statement of fact is made he will ask what principle is involved, and if it is a broad generalization will inquire what it exactly embraces, and if it is an exception to some general rule he will ask how much does it exclude. He will also ask under what circumstances the rule is true and what

qualifications are permissible. Statements contrary will be reconciled by some subtle distinction and the apparently irrelevant will be reduced to primary common elements. "The harmonization of apparent contradictions and the inter-linking of irrelevancies are two characteristics of the Talmudic method of text study." "The Talmudic student proceeds on the assumption that there is a uniformity and continuity in human reasoning."[1]

In his task of interpreting Philo, Professor Wolfson has certainly needed the subtlety of the Talmudic student with his "harmonization of apparent contradictions" and "interlinking of irrelevancies." As Drummond says, "Philo's apparent want of system is offensive to one who opens his works in order to discover his philosophical creed. Nowhere is any great philosophical question fully discussed, and brought to a clear conclusion; a multitude of passages have to be compared, and pieced together, and arranged, before anything resembling a philosophical system emerges into view. . . . His philosophy therefore, only comes in by the way, and is guided by the requirements of his biblical interpretation."[2] Those words should be borne in mind when considering how far Philo was able to contribute a *system* to the Middle Ages, and in this connection the remarks of Wolfson on I:97 and II:28 are of importance.

One disadvantage of this *pilpul* method is that all the texts available to its exponent are not available to the reader of his conclusions, nor can they be set out adequately for the reader's review, for this would require the analysis of whole books and not isolated quotations from them, but Professor Wolfson has tried to overcome this difficulty by supplying elaborate indexes of immense value to the student. In reality a review of this work should begin with the indexes and any review is inadequate if the way in which the texts have been deployed and studied is not clearly in the mind of the reader. We must take for granted that the texts bear the construction put upon them and that the author has grasped their meaning and that this preliminary study has been the basis of the scheme into which the quotations from this and that source fit. In other words we must be satisfied that the scheme has been achieved by an *a posteriori* process and is not simply proposed *a priori*. Is the thesis warranted by the texts read or is it something fixed previously in the interpreter's mind so that all subsequent research may be directed to the confirmation of it and to the discovery from the great mass of writings (and this should not be too difficult) pronouncements and arguments which support the interpreter's thesis and lead at last to a triumphant announcement that it is actually the thesis of the texts with which the interpreter had to deal.

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[1] vide *Crescas,* pp. 25 f.
[2] *Philo Judaeus,* I:1.

Let us take an instance from the present work (I:95). After asserting the pre-Philonic date of Aristeas, Aristobulus and 4 Maccabees, Professor Wolfson represents Philo's opinion as follows: "Philo himself refers to certain *oral philosophical interpretations of Scripture* which existed at his time and also to certain *written philosophical interpretations of Scripture in the possession of the Therapeutae*" (italics mine). To the ordinary reader this would mean that the Jewish Scripture had been philosophically interpreted before Philo both orally and in literature. The reference is to *De Vita Contemplativa*, 3:29, and this we find translated in the Loeb edition as follows: "They read the Holy Scriptures and seek wisdom from their ancestral philosophy by taking it as an allegory, since they think that the words of the literal text are symbols of something whose hidden nature is revealed by studying the underlying meaning. They have also writings of men of old, the founders of the way of thinking, who left many memorials of the form (i.e., system) used in allegorical interpretation and these they take as a kind of archetype and imitate the method in which this principle is carried out." (Interpolation mine.) From this it would seem that "treaties of ancient men" have become "written philosophical interpretations of Scripture" whereas it seems to us probable that the people described are not necessarily Jews at all since, just before (21), Philo says: "This kind exists in many places in the inhabited world, for perfect goodness must needs be shared both by Greeks and the world outside Greece, but it abounds in Egypt." The references here seem to be to allegorical interpretation practised by these people whether Jews or Greeks though the context has something to say about the Greeks and is not specifically about the Jews, unless it is *a priori* held to be impossible for Philo to have referred to Greek writings as "holy writings" (which Goodenough might dispute).

There is no doubt that the mediaevalist will read these pages with enthusiasm and profit. He will gain much light from the study of them and they will form a most convenient compendium of questions dealt with over and over again in mediaeval philosophy and theology. In proportion to his own appreciation of the subject he will stand in admiration at what Professor Wolfson has accomplished, marvelling at the industry shown, the patience in pursuing numerous lines of investigation and the simplicity of the style of exposition which only a master can achieve. But when the mediaevalist turns to the title of the book and realizes that it is about Philo he is brought to a stand. It was right that a book displaying the trends of mediaeval thought should make constant reference to Philo's treasure house for illustration of the antiquity of ideas and arguments, but to father the whole system on Philo, and to regard

him as founder and originator of the whole range of philosophical thought in the middle ages (cf. I:103) is quite a different thing and the reader begins to wonder whether he is being carried off his feet by a *tour de force*. Philo was a most prolific writer and his imagination was as prolific as his pen. He is unique as a recorder in a long period of silence with regard to philosophical developments (excepting, of course, the Stoic writers) since Aristotle. A glance at Wolfson's authorities confirms this. In his list of Greek, Latin and Jewish writers, apart from the LXX and the canonical and apocryphal Old Testament, the literature dated before Philo is very meager. Therefore Philo is often the only witness we have to the way in which certain philosophical problems had come to be discussed. He must on this account always remain a mine of information on trends of thought culminating in his day. He is also the first substantial witness to what took place at the wedding of Hellenistic thought with the Semitic religious genius. No one can afford to neglect him. The present writer when tracing the development of thought in Islam has found it necessary frequently to refer back to Philo for patterns of thought which did not distinctively follow Christian lines. The reason for this is not hard to find. Later Judaism, Christianity and Islam all exhibit the interaction of Hellenistic and Semitic types of thought founded on classical Greek philosophy and on a conception of revelation more or less related to the Old Testament respectively. It therefore seems inevitable that very similar types of question would be posed by Jews, Christians and Muslims when they became acquainted with Greek philosophy, especially when we remember Professor Wolfson's own dictum that the Talmudic student proceeds on the assumption that there is a uniformity and continuity in human reasoning. Moreover, the very material itself would impose the form of systematic thought repeated in the three religions and the questions would be such as need not wait for formulation by one particular mind. Such questions would be: the relation of human reason to divine revelation; whether the world was created or an emanation; what was the relation of God to the universe; what was the character of the word of God; how is the inspiration of the prophet related to the intellectual discipline of the philosopher; how are the abstractions of philosophy to be reconciled with the concept of the "Living God" described in more or less anthropomorphic terms in the revealed scriptures. We consider that these questions would be suggested, if not imposed, by the material itself while perhaps the substance of the answers would be definitely related to the dogmas laid down by the several revelations to which religious men offered belief or regarded as authoritative. We can then see Philo either as a mere recorder of what had taken place up to his time and so not necessarily the author of the

questions which put together produce the system or method, or we can see in him the first formulator of the questions, but we cannot say that either is proved, nor can we consider it a matter of such vital importance to establish Philo's originality.

It may even be doubted whether the hypothetico-deductive method can be pressed so far as to lead to any precision with reference to the sources of thought. These must be fixed by other methods in which external evidence will have a great deal to say and the absence of it fatal to any sound conclusion. The *pilpul* method by an accumulation of texts and cross references may lead to a strong presumption of the interplay of human thought and to prove that systems have not grown up in isolation but it is far from being an infallible system to display the actual living intermediaries and the links between the systems. It is remotely possible that by piling up instances and illustrations the interchange of thought between actual living persons might be shown as probable and if the mass of fact assembled were complete enough and without any serious gaps the person of greatest influence in achieving a new synthesis might be singled out. If we might take as an illustration the case of someone trying to establish the source of the evolutionary hypothesis, he might gather a mass of material pointing to the significance of Darwin's biological researches and then fix the evolutionary hypothesis as his peculiar contribution to human knowledge. If before him there were a complete absence of material for investigation this presumption would be strengthened but it might not be true. Someone with a wider knowledge and early material before him, e.g., that embodying Arabian biological theory or even earlier Neoplatonist patterns of thought which lend themselves to the hypothesis of evolution might come to the conclusion that here was a primitive pattern of thinking with, at various stages, an elaboration from the growing content of human information. It is precisely the same in our view in the present case. The method adopted is useful to display the patterns of human thought but to press it further than the stage of the hypothetical so far as actual sources are concerned is a most doubtful proceeding.

If Professor Wolfson wanted to prove his case, it would seem necessary for him to undertake the colossal (if not impossible) task of setting before us the negative results of researches from Plato and Aristotle to Philo, and these would have to be geographically as wide as the conquests of Alexander and culturally as diverse as Semitic prophetism is from Greek intellectualism. In this we should also require far more information than we have on the developments in Judaism before Philo.

If the intention were to sort out with any certainty the elements which Philo owed to the Greeks on the one side and the "native

Jewish tradition" on the other we would be bound to ask what clue we had to those elements on both sides, whether in the teaching of the schools on the Greek side or the principles of the exegesis of the Torah on the other. Have we on either side sufficient evidence to enable us to conclude: "This comes from the Greeks and this from the traditional lore of the Jews"? Can one go to a Jewish source later than Philo and claim for it an original revelatory character unsullied by any borrowing from Greek sources? The apocrypha would certainly not stand that test. Professor Wolfson seems continually to be trying to prove such an original unsullied "native Jewish tradition" from literature which is even centuries after Philo. Is there no possibility, seeing that Professor Wolfson claims such an extraordinary place for Philo, that such later writings have been influenced by Philo himself or if not that they have been influenced by a Hellenism derived elsewhere from which Philo also derived? Such problems inevitably arise and we cannot see how they can be answered. It might even be possible by making the widest possible reference to a mass of Jewish material admittedly of a date later than Philo to establish by the *pilpul* method a strong probability that Philo was deriving from a source common to the rest and that this was not unsullied Jewish tradition.

Furthermore, on both the Jewish and Greek sides we ought to leave room for possibilities other than a purely literary transmission of learning. Oral transmission was a widely practised method on both sides. Even as late as Plotinus we have the statements of Porphyry that he with Origen and Erennius were pledged not to divulge the doctrines of Ammonius and though he studied for eleven years under Ammonius, Plotinus wrote nothing for a long time, and Porphyry records in mitigation of Origen's offence in writing that he wrote nothing but "The Spirit-Beings" and "The King, the Sole Creator." Of Amelius he says he had learned almost the whole of Numenius by heart. That was the method. Philo himself must have been instructed and in the absence of other writers it is quite a legitimate assumption that his special uniqueness lies in this very fact that he "divulged" his instruction in the voluminous way we know. But that he was the sole one instructed in the way he discloses is questionable.

More than one hypothesis has been offered as to the position which Philo occupies; one emphasizes the Greek orientation of his thought so as to obscure almost completely any loyalty he may have had to the orthodox principles of Judaism, and the other so magnifying the native Jewish tradition behind him as to make us wonder what mediaeval Judaism was doing to have lost sight of this. What direct references to Philo have we in the greater body of Jewish

mediaeval literature? Even our present author who claims for Philo such a definite and exalted position as the philosopher who gave a "set of inflexible principles" to the Middle Ages, in the larger context of his work, as exhibited in his volumes on Spinoza, has in those two volumes only ten references to Philo's works. Wolfson will allow Philo direct access to Plato and Aristotle and the Stoic schools (which were in all probability still flourishing when Philo visited Rome) and maintains also that he was a faithful transmitter of Jewish systems of interpretation laid down before him. Was it not possible that those same principles of interpretation (in particular the allegorical method) were due to the assimilation of Rabbinical exegesis to Greek principles of allegorical interpretation (as old as Xenophanes) before Philo lived? The criticism of anthropomorphism goes back at least to Plato and Xenophanes and Xenophanes was the influence behind Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*. Though Professor Wolfson treats Heraclitus rather cavalierly in II:116f., it is still on record that he said "One thing, the Wise alone, is unwilling and yet willing to be called by the name of Zeus," which is embryonic at least to the doctrine of the unnameability of God which our author claims as original to Philo. The unity of creation was certainly no new doctrine, as witness the appellation "First Monist" given to Xenophanes in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Is there no reminiscence of Heraclitus' "cosmic law" (δίκη) in Philo's use of that word as e.g., in *De Specialibus Legibus* I.147? While it is true that *Wisdom* (xvi:20ff. and xviii:24) gives examples of allegorical usage by Jews, and in earlier works also there is similar evidence, Philo shows in many places that this was also a Greek practice and Wolfson himself recognises this fact. This has a double significance and could point to very early contacts between Jews and Greeks, and detract from Philo's originality as a synthesizer. It is even possible that the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Gospel according to St. John in points where they exhibit similarities with Philo are joint inheritors with him of these pre-Philonic synthesizers. Granting even the earliest date to Aristeas (and this is highly questionable) and assuming that his letter has not been subjected to later editing and interpolation (which seems quite likely), this and the LXX itself would give evidence of very early contact of Greek and Jewish types of thought and are not in themselves evidence of an unadulterated transmission of a "native Jewish tradition."

Professor Wolfson's enthusiasm for Philo leads him at times to some rather uncritical statements, (cf. I:375, 382 for his attitude to the inconsistencies in Philo). While one may readily concede that Philo is not the wayward and eccentric eclectic some people would make him out to be, it is unwise to be swayed by a dogma of his

perfect consistency and to reject some things which he plainly says because his consistency is at stake. For instance Wolfson says (I:275) in arguing for a particular view of the function of the "Powers" and after quoting *De Specialibus Legibus* I:329: "This would seem to be contradictory to some of the other statements which we have quoted above; and unless we assume that Philo did not know his own mind, or that he changed his mind, a way must be found to reconcile this statement with his other statements." Why should not Philo change his mind and why should he not be at times uncertain on the great themes of which he wrote? The fact is that there is nothing in Philo more difficult to unravel than the statements which he makes about the Powers. He had the impossible task of relating the unrelated. Wolfson's exposition is an over-simplification and is vitiated by the assumption of his that Philo could not have made inconsistent statements. Wolfson seems eager on his own account to prove that any idea of mediation by the powers is a fiction, and it is his own reluctance to accept such an idea that makes him see in the passage referred to a stumbling block. This is what Philo says: "When out of that shapeless and qualityless matter God produced all things, He did so without touching it Himself, since it was not lawful for his nature, happy and blessed as it was, to touch indefinite and confused matter, but instead He made full use of the incorporeal Powers well-denoted by their name of ideas, to enable each genus to take its appropriate shape" and at the end of the passage he describes these powers as ταῦτα δι' ὧν δῖ ποιόγητες, where their use as intermediaries is implied again. In this matter of the doctrine of the Powers, Philo is very perplexing. It is possible that they are to Philo simply phases of action or aspects of divine activity, but it is quite certain that they are often described as autonomous beings or as having some sort of autonomous being. They seem to act according to the will of God but also seem to have a sort of relative independence (cf. I:288). Wolfson is not at all clear when he sums up on p.290 where he allots, as it seems, three stages of existence to the powers: eternity in the mind of God, incorporeal being created before the creation of the world and implantation in the world when it was created. Then Wolfson goes on to say that these are not "successive" stages and tries to elucidate his own meaning. If these are not successive stages are they simultaneous? If they are simultaneous what is the significance of the division in terms of time? In I:237 he is also at pains to explain that Philo's expressions in many places are not to be taken as implying a doctrine of emanations. This does not seem to us to be justly said, but to be due to an assumption that Philo could not be thinking in terms of emanation and so whatever he said he did

not mean emanation. Our reading of Philo suggests to us that he was not clear at all as between emanation, manifestation and creation. It is possible that we might see an approximation to the concept of emanation in his Logos doctrine and more of a conception of manifestation in his doctrine of the Powers and the Glory of the Lord. The point of all this is that in trying to make Philo consistent there is a danger of misrepresenting him and also of concluding that a doctrine must have been fully formed instead of being in the process of formation. Philo to our mind gives more evidence of the latter than of the former.

This review has already grown to inordinate proportions but there are still some points to be considered in relation to the larger and more important purpose of this series, and from which the author's concentration on Philo might easily distract us. What place has this study in relation to the later developments in Christianity and Islam? Professor Wolfson is not going to expect us to accept the idea that Aquinas bases on Philo. The *direct* quotation of Philo is so infrequent in the Middle Ages, even among Jewish writers, that one might be justified in considering his influence negligible. How many times, for instance, do we find any mention of him in Maimonides' *Moreh Nebuchim*? Or are we to consider that the early Christian documents are Philonic or that those which are not have been negligible in the building up of the thought of the Middle Ages? Wolfson in the whole of his thousand pages has references to the Christian Scriptures on sixteen pages only and in three of these the reference is in a footnote (I:187; II:250, 277). In I:196 and II:151 he refers to the Gospel according to St. John through Origen. One reference is purely incidental (II:115) to a discussion of Norden's theory of "the unknown God." I:377; II:241 and II:349 are purely concerned with Greek terminology. The remainder are I:397 "God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob" and "God of the living not of the dead," I:461 Paul's statement that all Israel shall be saved, II:64, 66 on modes of prophecy, II:307. "The gentiles which have not the Law do by nature the things of the Law" and II:432-3 the most important, where the use of the terms "ecclesia," "sons of God," "the Israel of God" are shown to be common to Philo and the New Testament, and Christ's functions as King and Priest are referred to. If this is considered adequate in the present volume will it be in the next? In fact where do the Christian sources contemporaneous with Philo find a place at all in proportion to the influence they had in shaping the thought of the Middle Ages? Is Jesus significant only in a quotation from Spinoza? And what does this augur for the future when the Muslim developments come to be considered? Having so dogmatically fixed the

system as due to Philo shall we find that in the later reviews because this is regarded as so definitive in the mind of Professor Wolfson the vast and diverse Islamic literature will be searched to support the present system proposed by him, becoming the *a priori* assumptions to which the later developments must conform? We hope not, because this would be to prejudice the whole matter. We have a lurking feeling that too much emphasis is being given to the system and form and far too little to the substance; too much importance attached to the table of contents, as it were, the patterns of men's thought and too little to the color and texture of the material. As we have said, we find ourselves in a large measure of agreement with Professor Wolfson in regard to the actual *pattern* of the thought but this does not mean that all men think alike, or even that all mediaeval philosophers were saying the same thing and that they got it all from Philo. Let us take the question of *creatio ex nihilo*. It is clear that Philo gives us evidence that the question was posed at a very early date but, whatever conclusion Philo may have come to about it, the succeeding ages persistently debated this against the alternative of the eternity of the world. Even if Philo was the original formulator of the question, which we consider extremely doubtful, the later philosophers varied very greatly in the conclusions they reached. Or take the question of whether there is such a thing as emanation from the divine. Wolfson declares that we may consider that Philo did not teach emanation. If he did not then it seems quite clear that the Neoplatonists did not follow him. The question was also posed as to the relation between philosophy and revelation but to consider that all the answers were substantially in accord with Philo's would be erroneous. To say that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity in Christianity (I:197) is a "direct development of the doctrine of ideas as revised by Philo" does far less than justice to the Christian point of view. "In Christianity the idea is not prompted by any metaphysical theory but is welcomed as adequate to the description of revealed facts and as affirming the substance of faith," would more nearly represent what the Christian thinks.

That the range of Islamic reference is meager may be accounted for by the fact that we have not reached the period when this can be adequately dealt with but we hope that in the interim this has not been pre-judged. It should be noted that in the references on II:64 the Quranic passages do not exactly bear the construction put upon them: one is concerned with the aiding of Jesus by the Holy Spirit usually identified with the angel Gabriel and the other concerned with the meaning of the "spirit," in reply to those who had asked the prophet Muhammad what he meant by *rūḥ* and neither

is particularly significant for a differentiation of the modes of prophecy. The reference to Ibn Rushd would leave the uninstructed under the impression that he spoke for orthodox Islam (I:159) and there seems to be too much inferred from the references given in II:154: because Baghdādī is describing the heretical sects and enumerating differences, and Al-Ghazzālī is giving an objective description of a school which did not represent his own particular view. It seems to us that Wolfson's argument requires the *acceptance* of the idea of the namelessness of God, whereas neither of these authorities can be used to prove this. Muslim theology accepted the *ṣifāt* and the names although the mode of the relation of the attributes to the essence of God was in debate and Ibn Ḥazm regarded the attributes as names. The ninety-nine names of God witness to the orthodox opinion in this matter. It may be that Wolfson would reply that he was concerned here with the opinion of the *ḥukamā'* and not with the general religious belief in Islam. It may be so but this is not a distinction which he has observed on the Jewish side where he gives quite a good deal of attention to substantiating the "native Jewish tradition." Both on the Muslim side here and the Christian side as noted above, it is not so much what Wolfson says as what he omits which is significant, and in passing we might note that over-insistence on the point that Philo teaches the namelessness of God does less than justice to the importance with which the "Name" was regarded among the Jews.

The criticisms which we have felt compelled to make to this work of major importance are a tribute to its stimulating effect. Such work is not honored by an empty eulogy.

J. W. Sweetman

Selly Oak Colleges,
Birmingham, England

Islam and Christian Theology: A Study of the Interpretation of Theological Ideas in the Two Religions. Part One, Volume II: The Theological Position at the Close of the Period of Christian Ascendancy in the Near East. By J. Windrow Sweetman, D.D. London, Lutterworth Press, 1947, pp. 285, 18 shillings.

The entire work is to consist of three parts: Part One, Origins—in two volumes; Part Two, Scholastic Development; Part Three, Critical Reconstruction. Volume I was reviewed in *The Moslem World* for 1946 (Vol. xxxvi, pp. 361 f).

Dr. Sweetman has spent most of his life in India. He has been a lecturer at the Henry Martyn School of Islamic Studies in Aligarh. He is now a member of the staff of the Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham, England. This investigation has been a lifelong pursuit. The materials presented by him in Volume I have documented already the indebtedness of the Qur'ān and early Islamic belief to Judaism and Christianity. Volume II continues the study, and we take up once more the thread of the discussion.

In the early Islamic community the simplest statement of belief was considered sufficient. Attention was devoted to the regulation of common life, the beginning of canon law, and to the organization of the Islamic State. The Qur'ān, traditional materials, and Arab custom provided the necessary basis. This practical emphasis was in accord with Arab mentality. The rise of the Omayyads to power, when authority passed from devout Muslims to their former persecutors, aroused acute feelings and differences of opinion, and initiated theological discussion. Also the influx of non-Arabs into Islam introduced a mentality of religious disputation, and to a degree religious concepts from their non-Muslim past.

At the time of the Arab invasions, the Christian community was the dominant element in the intellectual life of the Near and Middle East, a position which it continued to hold for some three centuries. In the Christian community there existed already a systematized body of carefully defined religious thought. A prevailing characteristic of the Islamic movement in general, as it came in contact with peoples of higher culture, was assimilation, so that Muslim culture was developed by graftings from the prevailing culture of the times. In this study we are given fresh and impressive evidence of the fact that emerging theological thought in Islam was assimilative, and that it made use of (as well as antagonized) non-Islamic theological materials, as they became available.

It is here admitted that the Muslims had adequate distinctive data of their own in the Qur'ān and the Traditions, both to serve as a basis for theology, and to give rise to sectarian differences of interpretation. The use of extra-Islamic materials is inferred from the resemblances, when Muslim thought is compared with Christian and pre-Christian religious thinking. Dr. Sweetman confirms the findings of von Kremer that in the matter of the Being and Attributes of God and in the matter of the Freewill of Man both topic and argument were transferred from the Christian to the Muslim circle. But he hesitates to ascribe the origin of these doc-

trines in Islam to the influence of Christian thought alone. Other considerations had a place.

In the formulation of orthodox Muslim belief, after the initial statements of religious law, there arose an ethical debate, caused by political events, and, as Dr. Sweetman shows, solution was sought by the application of religious principles. Upon this there followed a slow progressive adjustment of Muslim religious thought to the thought of its new non-Muslim environment. The synthesis achieved by al-Ash'ari (d. 873) between the claims of tradition and reason, and the synthesis achieved by al-Ghazali (d. 1111) between Asharite formalism and mysticism were milestones in the development. The present is the first comprehensive study that has been made of this formative period from a comparative point of view. From Arabic and Greek sources the ideas of many religious thinkers are adduced, and many texts are for the first time published in English translation. The erudition and the industry required are patent. The result, aside from the direct purpose of the study, is an invaluable thesaurus of the religious thought of the period.

Dr. Sweetman finds that in this era Muslim thinkers were concerned to defend orthodoxy against splits in Islam, and also against Christian thought and Greek philosophy. The defense is conceived in a manner suggesting the Christian statements. The Christian mental situation and problem are taken up, and then the solution given in a Muslim way. Non-orthodox thinkers often support Christian positions. In both Christian and Muslim thought there is the framework of Hellenistic philosophy. The methods are those of the Greek dialectic. The fundamental data are in the one case those summarized in the Apostles' Creed, and in the other those summarized in the Muslim Words of Witness. Granted a difference in the materials regarded as basal, the similarities are much greater than common opinion has maintained.

The purpose of the present study is not to furnish a history of the development of Muslim theological thought. For that the author refers his readers to Wensinck's *The Muslim Creed.* The purpose is to marshal many examples of Muslim religious thought in the centuries under consideration, and with them relevant citations from Christian and other non-Muslim thinkers. What is sought is not proof of literary dependence. Where different languages are concerned such proof is almost impossible. Rather, what is looked for is similarity of thought. The argument for relationship arising from multiplied similarities is cumulative. In this process many little known Muslim thinkers come to attention. The indexes give the names of more than two hundred Muslims, most of them thinkers whose support of various opinions is part of the evidence. Over sixty of the names occur in the list of authors of whose works use is made.

Who were the Christian and other non-Muslim religious thinkers, whose works were available to Muslim theologians? Before answering, it may be of value to remind ourselves that our Western understanding of Christian religious thought has been dominated by the standards of so-called orthodox theology. The tendency of these standards is to make our field of vision partial. We may fail to glimpse the wide panorama of the thinking that actually went on

among religious men. In examining the problem of possible relationships between Muslim and non-Muslim thinking, no religious thinkers should be banned. And again, we tend to forget that the imperial and cultural center of the Mediterranean world in those days was Constantinople, and that the stronghold of Christianity was in the Near and Middle East. To the Christians of those lands their own theologians were normative.

Dr. Sweetman reminds us of the translation movement, first from Greek into Syriac, and then from Syriac and Greek into Arabic. He mentions known Syriac translations of the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia, and of Diodorus of Tarsus. Works existing in Syriac may be considered to have been available. He mentions the testimony of the *Fihrist* that writings of Gregory of Nyssa were translated into Arabic, and the fact that important Muslim writers show acquaintance with Biblical passages. The works of John of Damascus, he says, should be "considered available." Other Greek authors brought into comparison extensively are Philo and the Christian writers of Alexandria.

So far as a judgment regarding Dr. Sweetman's survey is concerned, competent scholars who read his manuscript previous to publication agreed that the Muslim authors consulted were sound, that the translations in which the book abounds were reliable, that the treatment of Muslim teaching was not partisan, and that unfair comparisons had been avoided.

Mention should be made of the three supplementary articles, and of the forty pages devoted to indexes. In Appendix I the Syriac term for the Persons of the Trinity, which is the one in current use in Arabic, is shown to be originally a Biblical word (John 5.26). Appendix II gives a list of all the abrogated Quranic verses, with the verses by which they are cancelled. Appendix III analyzes the Quranic vocabulary for the Divine Will and Purpose.

John E. Merrill

Beacon, N. Y.

A Short History of the Middle East: from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times. By George E. Kirk. London, Methuen & Co., 1948. pp. 289, with 14 maps and a 'List of Authorities' arranged by chapters. 16/. Also, Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press, 1949.

This short book contains a thoughtful, comprehensive and well integrated survey of the political history of the Middle East. It grew out of lectures presented to students at the Middle East Centre for Arab Affairs.

The author's main emphasis is placed on the growth of nationalism and political maturity in Egypt and the Arab states. This is divided into two main periods. The first traces 'The Struggle for Independence, 1914-1939,' showing first Turkey, then England and France as the chief obstacles to the realization of the hopes for independence raised during the Young Turk revolution of 1908 and crystallized in the Arab revolt. Mr. Kirk states that by 1939 it was only the autocratically ruled states on the periphery of the Middle East: *i.e.,* Turkey, Persia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen which had

achieved full political independence. The second period deals with events during and since the second world war to the spring of 1948. The war time intervention of the Allies in Egypt, the Levant, Iraq and Persia (Iran) retarded the evolution of self-government. Resultant insistence of these countries upon their sovereign rights has marked the years since 1945. The promise of the Arab League as an instrument which might help to improve regional agricultural, social and industrial potentials has not been realized, in the author's opinion, because undue emphasis was placed on its political committee and the struggle against Zionism. Over half the book gives a cogent analysis of these political developments. This gains force because of the background material on the pre-Islamic Middle East and its cultural, economic and political transitions under various Muslim rulers summarized in earlier chapters. The dependence of politics upon social aspects such as education, and on economic factors such as land tenure and use, and indigenous industry is emphasized.

There is a fine balance achieved throughout between the relation of foreign influences on the area and local changes which in turn were reflected outside the Middle East. This interaction is particularly well handled in the discussion of Islamic learning and its relation to medieval scholarship; in the consideration of western economic imperialism which helped to sow the seeds of Arab revival and whose interests in oil alone form the chief source of revenue of several Middle Eastern states; and in the comparison of Russian and European-American policies in the area with the reactions of its inhabitants toward them.

Such a condensed study must inevitably leave out important material. Early in the book 'the cohesive force of the system of legal and social regulations for the direction of the Muslim community, begun by the Prophet' that has imposed a lasting sense of unity on the Muslim world is stressed. At the end, the reader is reminded that fundamentally no economic or political system alone can improve man's lot. Spiritual regeneration is essential. As he believes this, it is regrettable, yet understandable, that Mr. Kirk has had to emphasize political history at the expense of a fuller consideration of the intellectual and moral currents in contemporary Islam.

HOWARD A. REED

Princeton, N. J.

Kurds and Kurdistan. By Arshak Safrastian. London, The Harvill Press, 1948. pp. 106. 7s. 6d.

The book begins with the recounting of some interesting incidents that throw light on the life and character of the Kurds. These people have inhabited, from the time before recorded history, the high mountains where Turkey joins Iraq and Iran. The Armenian author of this little book has lived among them and made a study of these people.

The main part of the small volume deals with history from times before written records on down to the present. Various eras are treated in short sections of a few paragraphs, down to the mod-

ern struggles of the Kurds against Turkey, which are given in a little more detail.

There is a chapter on "Islam and Kurdistan" which includes the story of the great leader Salaheddin (Saladin) who defeated the Crusaders on so many fields. This great Muslim general was a Kurd. Though the Kurds are nominally Sunni Muslims, the regular Islamic practices are usually confined to the Kurds of the cities or larger towns. Those of the nomadic mountain tribes would pay about as much respect to old Christian shrines as to Muslim, at least in the experience of the author.

Those who have a special interest in the Kurdish people will welcome this small volume though it does not add much of great value from the scholarly or scientific standpoint. It is a concise contribution to an outline of the Kurdish history.

J. Christy Wilson

Princeton, N. J.

Out of Exile: by Soetan Sjahrir. New York, The John Day Company, pp. 265. $3.00.

The author was born March 5, 1909 in the Minangkabau region of Sumatra's west coast. He received his elementary and secondary education in Medan, Sumatra and in Bandoeng, Java. Later he went to Holland where he studied law at the University of Leyden. The years he spent in Holland helped him to acquire a growing interest in western ideals and philosophy. At the same time he developed a keen understanding of the Dutch people and their institutions. While a student at Leyden he met a Dutch young lady whom he later married.

Mr. Sjahrir's growing interest in the welfare of his people led him to identify himself with the Indonesian Association in Holland which was noted for its nationalistic and socialistic aspects. In 1932 he returned to Indonesia, leaving his wife in Holland, in order that he might better acquaint himself with the new political movements in his home-land, fully expecting to return after two years and complete the studies for his degree at the university. In February 1934, as he was on the point of sailing for Holland he was arrested by the Netherlands Indies police and imprisoned at Tjipinang, Java. Sjahrir had joined the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (P.N.I.) or Society for National Indonesian Education. Membership in the P.N.I. was not forbidden by the Dutch yet his efforts to expand the educational facilities for the Indonesians along western lines led the Netherlands Indies authorities to feel that he was a dangerous political figure. He was held in prison for a year without specific charges being lodged against him. In 1935 he was transferred to Boven Digoel, in New Guinea. During the period 1936 to 1942 he lived on the island of Banda Neira in the Moluccas. While he was not confined to prison during these years yet he was not permitted to leave the island. When the Japanese began their attack on the Netherlands Indies in January 1942 Sjahrir, along with other Indonesian political prisoners, was released by the Dutch authorities

as part of an effort to enlist the loyalty of the Indonesian intellectual leaders.

In November 1945 Mr. Sjahrir was appointed Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia. He held this position in addition to the portfolio of Foreign Minister in his cabinet until January 27, 1947, except for a hiatus of one month in 1946. After giving up his post as Prime Minister he came to the U.S.A. as Ambassador at Large to represent the interests of the Republic of Indonesia at the United Nations Security Council at Lake Success.

Out of Exile is a compilation of the letters which Sjahrir wrote to his wife in Holland from the time of his imprisonment in 1934 till March 1938. After concluding these letters he adds a further section of the book called "Action," which continues the story through the war years during which time he headed the anti-Japanese underground in Java. It also contains a brief but concise statement of events which led up to the so-called "police action" of the Dutch in 1947.

The book gives a remarkably clear statement setting forth the weakness of Dutch Colonialism as practiced in the Indies. Mr. Sjahrir writes without evidencing any sense of bitterness and reveals a deep understanding of the Dutch position in her efforts to develop her colonies. In his more philosophical passages he reveals a sense of regret for what colonialism has done to the Dutch in that it has dulled her appreciation of the right of all men to self-expression and the privilege of self-government.

In the second part of the book called "Action" the author gives a brief account of the events which transpired in the Indies following the fall of Holland in May 1940 until his resignation as Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia in 1947. He gives what may be called a well balanced statement of the changing scene in Indonesia, though one could wish that he had given some account of the actions of the radical Indonesian factions which did so much to undermine and discredit the worthy ideals of the responsible leaders of the Indonesian Republic.

RAYMOND L. ARCHER

New York City

Oriental Art. A Quarterly Journal Devoted to the Study of All Forms of Oriental Art. Volume 1, Number 1, Summer 1948. 41 pp., 36 plates. The Oriental Art Magazine, Ltd., 3 Victoria Street, London, S.W.1. $10 per annum.

Dr. William Cohn, already well-known as the founder and editor of the *Ostasiatische Zeitschrift,* now brings a new and valuable member to the family of art publications.

The first issue of this British quarterly appears in very attractive form. Printed on heavy-coated glazed stock, it is handsomely illustrated with thirty-six half-tone and line plates. The contents of this number are devoted exclusively to the arts of India and China.

The standard of this publication is high, and there is every reason to assume that it will find many interested lay readers as well as scholars in the field of Oriental art.

MEHMED A. SIMSAR

CURRENT TOPIC

Arabic as the Religious Language of the Muslims

In 1942 Dr. S. Inayatullah, a Lecturer in Arabic at the Government College, Lahore, published a short treatise on "Why we Learn the Arabic Language." (It was reviewed by the late Prof. James A. Montgomery in the January 1947 issue of THE MOSLEM WORLD, p. 66. ED.) It is because of the increased interest among missionaries in India, and in Pakistan in particular, in the question of gaining preparation for association with their Muslim friends that the following paragraphs are quoted. It is a forcible statement and requires no comment:

"Arabic is of supreme importance as the religious language of the Muslims, who constitute about one fifth of the human race. The Qur'ān and the Traditions of the Prophet, which are the two main fountain-heads of the religious and cultural life of Islam, are in Arabic. The same remark applies to their numerous satellite disciplines. Translations into other languages, however painstaking and accurate, cannot be of much use in a first-hand study of Islamic faith and civilization. Any serious student of religious history who desires to specialize in the study of Islam and wants to understand the religious character of the Muslim society must learn Arabic. Religion enters into the daily life of the Muslims to such a great extent that even those peoples, with whom Arabic is not the mother tongue, become more or less familiar with the Arabic language through religious usages and ceremonial. Again and again in the Qur'ān is emphasis laid on the fact that the Word of God has been revealed in the Arabic language; and from one end of the Muslim world to the other, whatever may be the living speech of the people—whether it be Berber, Hausa, Pashto, Persian, Turkish, Urdu, Javanese or Malay—prayers are everywhere repeated five times a day in Arabic; the faithful greet one another in familiar Arabic phrases; the sacred text, though translated into many other languages, is read in the original Arabic. The Arabic words in the Islamic creed *(La ilaha ill' Allah; Muhammad Rasul Allah)* are whispered in the ear of the new-born babe; these are among the first sentences the growing child is taught to utter; and these should be the last words on the lips of the dying. In non-Arabic countries, Arabic may be a foreign tongue, but it is studied there by all the learned *('Ulama),* and the learned constitute whatever clergy Islam possesses, and from them the unlettered multitudes derive their knowledge of the faith and, incidentally, some familiarity with the language which is indissolubly associated with that faith. . . .

"Without Arabic Islam would be only imperfectly intelligible. For any understanding of the thoughts that sway the lives of the Muslims, the beliefs they hold most sacred and the principles of theology and ethics in which they are brought up, we must have recourse to Arabic, which is the original and main repository of all the religious sciences of Islam."

—From the *Bulletin of the Henry Martyn School of Islamics,* January, 1949.

SURVEY OF PERIODICALS

By Sue Molleson Foster
Union Theological Seminary Library

I. GENERAL

The Archaeological Park in Istambul. Thomas Whittemore. (In *Archaeology,* N. Y. December, 1948. pp. 203-205).

Because of an extensive fire, a large area is accessible for excavations which should unearth rich Byzantine and pre-Byzantine remains.

Deux Fresques Omeyyades. Daniel Schlumberger. (In *Syria,* Paris. Vol. 25, 1948. pp. 86-102).

Elaborately illustrated account of the Chateau of Qasr el-Heir el-Gharbi in Palmyra.

Notes sur Quelques Monuments Musulmans de Syrie. J. Sauvaget. (In *Syria,* Paris. Vol. 24, 1944-45. pp. 210-231; Vol. 25, 1946-48. pp. 259-267).

Descriptions of buildings in Damascus, Aleppo and Hama, suggested by articles by E. Herzfeld in *Ars Islamica.*

La Première Civilisation du Djebel Druze. Le R. P. A. Beaulieu. (In *Syria,* Paris. Vol. 24, 1945. pp. 232-250).

Tells of research in the vicinity of Soueida.

II. ARABIA

The Date and the Arab. V. H. W. Dowson. (In the *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. January, 1949. pp. 34-41).

The date palm is so interwoven with Arab existence that without it the whole course of Arabian history might have been changed.

The Liquid Gold of Arabia. Brig. Stephen Longrigg. (In the *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. January, 1949. pp. 20-33).

An account of the social and economic results of the development of the oil industry.

Yemen: a Brief Survey. Squadron-Leader Eric Macro. (In the *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. January, 1949. pp. 42-53).

An historical and descriptive record of a country important to England.

III. HISTORY OF ISLAM

The Persian Gulf—a Romance. (In *The Round Table,* London. March, 1949. pp. 131-137).

For centuries merely a pocket between Persia and Arabia, the Gulf now teems with activity created by the development of oil.

IV. QUR'ĀN, TRADITION, THEOLOGY

Eine Christliche Parallele zu den Paradiesesjungfrauen des Korans? Edmund Beck, O.S.B. (In *Orientalia Cristiana Periodica,* Roma. Vol. 14, pts. 3-4, 1948. pp. 398-405).

The author presents arguments against Tor Andrae's position that Syrian Christian preachers inspired the Muslim idea.

V. RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL LIFE

THE ABDALS IN EASTERN TURKISTAN. Kaarlo Hildén. (In the *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. January, 1949. pp. 72-77).

Anthropological and linguistic research shows the tribe to have come from the Near East despite its present location among Mongoloid groups.

AMERICAN MONOPOLIES IN EGYPT. S. Topolev. (In *New Times,* Moscow. July 7, 1948. pp. 24-26).

Tells of the activities of American business in the economic, political, military and cultural life of the country.

ARAB BACKGROUND. Freya Stark. (In *The Quarterly Review,* London. January, 1949. pp. 55-65).

The Arabs of to-day, like their predecessors through the centuries, are formed by natural initiative, by the desert, by trade and, more recently, by oil.

EDUCATION IN IRAN NOW AND IN THE FUTURE. Dr. Ahmad Aliabadi. (In the *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. January, 1949. pp. 62-66).

The author finds a need for more freedom in teaching and in research and less centralization in the educational organization.

THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN EGYPT. S. Hillelson. (In *The Geographical Journal,* London. January, 1949. pp. 91-92).

A thorough review of "Egypt: an economic and social analysis" by Charles Issawi.

SOME NOTES ON THE KAZAKS OF SINKIANG. Ian Morrison. (In the *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. January, 1949. pp. 67-71).

This nomadic, pastoral Muslim people are combating the spread of Communism in their territory.

THREE CLASSES IN EGYPT. C. J. P. Hughes. (In the *Fortnightly Review,* London. July, 1948. pp. 259-272).

An able analysis of the main divisions of Egyptian society and their advantages and disadvantages.

VI. POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

THE FOREIGN TRADE OF EGYPT, SYRIA AND LEBANON. (In *Palestine Affairs,* New York. August, 1948. pp. 95-97).

The economic position of these three countries is fairly secure.

GERMANY'S POSITION VIS A VIS THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF EGYPT. Muhammad Mustafa Safwat. (In *Al-Kitāb,* Cairo. June, 1948. pp. 19-26).

An historical article.

THE LIBYAN QUESTION. Tahir Khemiri. (In *The Islamic Review,* Woking. January, 1949. pp. 38-41).

A recommendation for the country's independence under the sovereignty of the Emir El-Sayyid Idris.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN IRAN, 1941-1948. L. P. Elwell-Sutton. (In *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D. C. January, 1949. pp. 45-62).

An historical account.

STRAINS AND STRESSES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Emil Lengyel. (In the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences,* New York. July, 1948. pp. 8-13).

A discussion of Turkey's need for allies other than the United States.

UNITY AND NATIONALISM IN LIBYA. Ben Rivlin. (In *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D. C. January, 1949. pp. 31-44).

Presents reasons for the establishment of an international trusteeship under the administration of the United Nations.

VII. PALESTINE

ARABS IN ISRAEL. Bernard D. Weinryb. (In *Palestine Affairs,* New York. October, 1948. pp. 113-115).

Describes the first steps taken by the Government to integrate the Arabs into Israel.

THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND ITS PROBLEMS. Edwin Samuel. (In *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D. C. January, 1949. pp. 1-16).

Gives an outline of the governmental structure and discusses such matters as the settlement of boundaries, finance and the question of the Arab population.

A HUMAN DISASTER. E. Atiyyah. (In *The Islamic Review,* Woking. January, 1949. pp. 52-54).

Stresses the plight of the Arab refugees who to-day number three times as many as the Jewish displaced persons in Europe and whose condition is far worse.

LA PALESTINE ET LA POLITIQUE DES GRANDES PUISSANCES. Jacob Yeredar. (In *La Politique Etrangère,* Paris. June, 1948. pp. 235-244).

An analysis of the motives behind the actions of the major powers.

RECENT BOOKS ON THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINE. J. C. Hurewitz. (In *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D. C. January, 1949. pp. 86-91).

Consists of short reviews.

U.N. BREATHING SPELL ON PALESTINE. Robert Weltsch. (In *Commentary,* New York. January, 1949. pp. 45-50).

Although Arab-Jewish relations are still far from settled, the question of the Holy Land has been shelved until the autumn of 1949 by the Conciliation Commission of the U.N.

VIII. INDIA AND PAKISTAN

CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE OF PAKISTAN. Aslam Malik. (In *Asian Horizon,* London. Winter, 1949. pp. 58-66).

A critical account, with quotations.

THE CULTURAL BACKGROUND OF PAKISTAN. Abdul Majid. (In *Asian Horizon,* London. Autumn, 1948. pp. 65-69).

Muslim civilization in India reaches back for its beginning to Islamic conquerors who invaded the country in 712 A.D., coming from the West.

THE JUDICIARY IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN. Sir Patrick Spens. (In *The Asiatic Review,* London. January, 1949. pp. 449-468).

Discusses changed conditions encountered since the Independence Act and the transfer of power in 1947.

KASHMIR. Gen. Sir Frank Messervy. (In *The Asiatic Review,* London.

The author believes that Kashmir, with the exception of the southeast portion of Jammu Province, should belong to Pakistan for ethnological, economic and geographical reasons.

WHITHER EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN? Prof. A. S. Bokhari. (In *Asian Horizon,* London. Autumn, 1948. pp. 30-37).

Efforts must be made to remedy illiteracy, to promote the study of Urdu and the Islamic outlook, at the same time preserving the teaching of English.

IX. MISSIONS TO MUSLIMS

AFGHANISTAN. H. E. Rawlence. (In *World Dominion and the World To-day,* London. March-April, 1949. pp. 91-92).

The country offers a great challenge to Christian missions because it is such a Muslim stronghold.

THE CHRISTIAN MINORITIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST. J. W. R. F. (In *The Dublin Review,* London. Part 4, 1948. pp. 63-71).

An account of Roman Catholics in the Arab League.

THE DOCTOR AS EVANGELIST. Wilfred Morris. (In *World Dominion and the World Today,* London. March-April, 1949. pp. 87-90).

Medical work in the United Provinces is combined with Gospel preaching and teaching.

THE ISLAMIC STATE AND CHRISTIAN WITNESS. J. W. Sweetman. (In *World Dominion and the World To-day,* London. March-April, 1947. pp. 90-95).

Now, when Islam is pressingly concerned with political problems, a united Christianity should confront it with a strong, loving spiritual message.

THREE TYPES OF MOSLEM LEADERS. George K. Harris. (In *China's Millions,* New York. February, 1947. pp. 25-26).

The author's acquaintance with influential Moslem teachers, farmers and holy men provided access to many souls and much opportunity for evangelistic work.